1LL1N01S  HISTORICAL  SURVEY 


REASONS   FOR   PARDONING 


FIELDEN,  NEEBE  AND  SCHWAB 


JOHN    P.    ALTOELD, 

CiOVERNOB    OF    ILLINOIS. 


STATEMENT  OF  THE  CASE. 


On  the  night  of  May  4,  1886,  a  public  meeting  was  held 
on  Haymarket  Square  in  Chicago;  there  were  from  800  to 
1,000  people  present,  nearly  all  being  laboring  men.  There 
had  been  trouble,  growing  out  of  the  effort  to  introduce  an 
eight-hour  day,  resulting  in  some  collisions  with  the  police,  in 
one  of  which  several  laboring  people  were  killed,  and  this 
meeting  was  called  as  a  protest  against  alleged  police  bru- 
tality. 

The  meeting  was  orderly  and  was  attended  by  the  mayor, 
who  remained  until  the  crowd  began  to  disperse  and  then 
went  away.  As  soon  as  Capt.  John  Bonfield,  of  the  police 
department,  learned  that  the  mayor  had  gone,  he  took  a  de- 
tachment of  police  and  hurried  to  the  meeting  for  the  pur- 
pose of  dispersing  the  few  that  remained,  and  as  the  police 
approached  the  place  "of  meeting  a  bomb  was  thrown  by  some 
unknown  person,  which  exploded  and  wounded  many  and 
killed  several  policemen,  among  the  latter  being  one  Mathias 
Degan.  A  number  of  people  were  arrested  and  after  a  time 
August  Spies,  Albert  R.  Parsons,  Louis  Lingg,  Michael 


STATEMENT  OF  THE  CASE, 


On  the  night  of  May  4,  1886,  a  public  meeting  was  held 
on  Haymarket  Square  in  Chicago;  there  were  from  800  to 
1,000  people  present,  nearly  all  being  laboring  men.  There 
had  been  trouble,  growing  out  of  the  effort  to  introduce  an 
eight-hour  day,  resulting  in  some  collisions  with  the  police,  in 
one  of  which  several  laboring  people  were  killed,  and  this 
meeting  was  called  as  a  protest  against  alleged  police  bru- 
tality. 

The  meeting  was  orderly  and  was  attended  by  the  mayor, 
who  remained  until  the  crowd  began  to  disperse  and  then 
went  away.  As  soon  as  Capt.  John  Bonfield,  of  the  police 
department,  learned  that  the  mayor  had  gone,  he  took  a  do- 
tachment  of  police  and  hurried  to  the  meeting  for  the  pur- 
pose of  dispersing  the  few  that  remained,  and  as  the  police 
approached  the  place  *of  meeting  a  bomb  was  thrown  by  some 
unknown  person,  which  exploded  and  wounded  many  and 
killed  several  policemen,  among  the  latter  being  one  Mathias 
Degan.  A  n amber  of  people  were  arrested  and  after  a  time 
August  Spies,  Albert  E.  Parsons,  Louis  Lingg,  Michael 


Schwab,  Samuel  Fielden,  George  Engle,  Adolph  Fischer  and 
Oscar  Neebe  were  indicted  for  the  murder  of  Mathias  Degan. 
The  prosecution  could  not  discover  who  had  thrown  the 
bomb  and  could  not  bring  the  really  guilty  man  to  justice, 
and,  as  some  of  the  men  indicted  were  not  at  the  Haymar- 
ket  meeting  and  had  nothing  to  do  with  it,  the  prosecution 
was  forced  to  proceed  on  the  theory  that  the  men  indicted 
were  guilty  of  murder  because  it  was  claimed  they  had  at 
various  times  in  the  past  uttered  and  printed  incendiary  and 
seditious  language,  practically  advising  the  killing  of  police- 
men, of  Pinkerton  men  and  others  acting  in  that  capacity, 

and  that  they  were  therefore  responsible  for  the    murder  of 

\ 
Mathias  Degan.     The  public  was  greatly  excited  and  after  a 

prolonged  trial  all  of  the  defendants  were  found  guilty;  Os- 
car Neebe  was  sentenced  to  fifteen  years  imprisonment  and 
all  of  the  other  defendants  were  sentenced  to  be  hanged. 
The  case  was  carried  to  the  supreme  court  and  was  there 
affirmed  in  the  fall  of  1887.  Soon  thereafter  Lingg  commit- 
ted suicide.  The  sentence  of  Fielden  and  Schwab  was  com- 
muted to  imprisonment  for  life  and  Parsons,  Fischer,  Engle 
and  Spies  were  hanged,  and  the  petitioners  now  ask  to  have 
Neebe,  Fielden  and  Schwab  set  at  liberty. 

The  several  thousand  merchants,  bankers,  judges,  lawyers 

»  • 

and  other  prominent  citizens  of  Chicago  who  have  by  peti- 
tion, by  letter  and  in  other  ways  urged  executive  clemency, 
mostly  base  their  appeal  on  the  ground  that,  assuming  the 
prisoners  to  be  guilty,  they  have  been  punished  enough,  but 
a  number  of  them  who  have  examined  the  case  more  care- 


fully,  and  are  more  familiar  with  the  record  and  with  the 
facts  disclosed  by  the  papers  on  file,  base  their  appeal  on 
entirely  different  grounds.  They  assert, 

FIRST — That  the  jury  which  tried  the  case  was  a  packed 
jury  selected  to  convict. 

SECOND — That  according  to  the  law  as  laid  down  by  the 
supreme  court,  both  prior  to  and  again  since  the  trial  of 
this  case,  the  jurors,  according  to  their  own  answers,  were 
not  competent  jurors  and  the  trial  was  therefore  not  a  legal 
trial. 

THIRD — That  the  defendants  were  not  proven  to  be 
guilty  of  the  crime  charged  in  the  indictment. 

FOURTH — That  as  to  the  defendant  Neebe,  the  state's 
attorney  had  declared  at  the  close  of  the  evidence  that  there 
was  no  case  against  him,  and  yet  he  has  been  kept  in 
prison  all  these  years. 

FIFTH — That  the  trial  judge  was  either  BO  prejudiced 
against  the  defendants,  or  else  so  determined  to  win  the 
applause  of  a  certain  class  in  the  community  that  he  could 
not  and  did  not  grant  a  fair  trial. 

Upon  the  question  of  having  been  punished  enough  I 
will  simply  say  that  if  the  defendants  had  a  fair  trial,  and 
nothing  has  developed  since  to  show  that  they  are  not 
guilty  of  the  crime  charged  in  the  indictment,  then  there 
ought  to  be  no  executive  interference,  for  no  punishment 
under  our  laws  could  then  be  too  severe.  Government  must 


defend  itself;  life  and  property  must  be  protected  and  law 
and  order  must  be  maintained;  murder  must  be  punished, 
and  if  the  defendants  are  guilty  of  murder,  either  committed 
with  their  own  hands  or  by  some  one  else  acting  on  their 
advice,  then,  if  they  have  had  a  fair  trial,  there  should  be 
in  this  case  no  executive  interference.  The  soil  of  America 
is  not  adapted  for  the  growth  of  anarchy.  While  our  insti- 
tutions are  not  free  from  injustice,  they  are  still  the  best 
that  have  yet  been  devised,  and  therefore  must  be  maintained. 

Was  the  Jury  Packed  ? 
I. 

The  record  of  the  trial  shows  that  the  jury  in  this 
case  was  not  drawn  in  the  manner  that  juries  usually 
are  drawn;  that  is,  instead  of  having  a  number  of  names 
drawn  out  of  a  box  that  contained  many  hundred  names,  as 
the  law  contemplates  shall  be  done  in  order  to  insure  a  fair 
jury  and  give  neither  side  the  advantage,  the  trial  judge 
appointed  one,  Henry  L.  Ryce  as  a  special  bailiff  to  go  out 
and  summon  such  men  as  he,  Ryce,  might  select  to  act  as 
jurors.  While  this  practice  has  been  sustained  in  cases  in 
which  it  did  not  appear  that  either  side  had  been  prejudiced 
thereby,  it  is  always  a  dangerous  practice,  for  it  gives  the 
bailiff  absolute  power  to  select  a  jury  that  will  be  favorable 
to  one  side  or  the  other.  Counsel  for  the  state,  in  their 
printed  brief,  say  that  Ryce  was  appointed  on  motion  of 
defendants.  While  it  appears  that  counsel  for  defendants  were 
in  favor  of  having  some  one  appointed,  the  record  has  this 
entry: 


"Mr.  Grinnell  (the  state's  attorney)  suggested  Mr.  Ryce  as 
special  bailiff  and  he  was  accepted  and  appointed."  But  it 
makes  no  difference  on  whose  motion  he  was  appointed  if  he 
did  not  select  a  fair  jury.  It  is  shown  that  he  boasted  while 
selecting  jurors  that  he  was  managing  this  case;  that  these 
fellows  would  hang  as  certain  as  death;  that  he  was  calling 
such  men  as  the  defendants  would  have  to  challenge  peremp- 
torily and  waste  their  challenges  on,  and  that  when  their  chal- 
lenges were  exhausted  they  would  have  to  take  such  men  as 
the  prosecution  wanted.  It  appears  from  the  record  of  the 
trial  that  the  defendants  were  obliged  to  exhaust  all  of  their 
peremptory  challenges  and  they  had  to  take  a  jury,  almost 
every  member  of  which  stated  frankly  that  he  was  prejudiced 
against  them.  On  pago  133  of  volume  1  of  the  record  it 
appears  that  when  the  panel  was  about  two-thirds  full, 
counsel  for  defendants  called  the  attention  of  the  court  to 
the  fact  that  Ryce  was  summoning  only  prejudiced  men,  as 
shown  by  their  examinations,  furth'er:  That  he  was  confin- 
ing himself  to  particular  classes,  t.  e.,  clerks,  merchants, 
manufacturers,  etc.  Counsel  for  defendants  then  moved  the 
court  to  stop  this  and  direct  Eyce  to  summon  the  jurors 
from  the  body  of  the  people,  that  is,  from  the  community  at 
large,  and  not  from  particular  classes;  but  the  court  refused 
to  take  any  notice  of  the  matter. 

For  the  purpose  of  still  further  showing  the  misconduct 
of  bailiff  flyce  reference  is  made  to  the  affidavit  of  Otis  S. 
Favor.  Mr.  Favor  is  one  of  the  most  reputable  and  honor- 
able business  men  of  Chicago;  he  was  himself  summoned  by 


8 

Ryco  as  a  juror,  but  was  so  prejudiced  against  the  defend- 
ants that  he  had  to  be  excused,  and  he  abstained  from  mak- 
ing any  affidavit  before  sentence  because  the  state's  attorney 
had  requested  him  not  to  make  it,  although  he  stood  ready  to 
go  into  court  and  tell  what  he  knew  if  the  court  wished  him 
to  do  so,  and  he  naturally  supposed  he  would  be  sent  for. 
But  after  the  supreme  court  had  passed  on  tHfe  case  and 
some  of  the  defendants  were  about  to  be  hanged  he  felt  that 
an  injustice  was  being  done  and  he  made  the  following  affi- 
davit: 

STATE  or  ILLINOIS,) 

[ss. 
COOK  COUNTY.          ) 

Otis  S.  Favor,  being  duly  sworn  on  oath  says  that  he  is  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  and  of  the  State  of  Illinois,  residing  in  Chicago, 
and  a  merchant  doing  business  at  Nos.  6  and  8  Wabash  avenue,  in  the 
city  of  Chicago,  in  said  county.  That  he  is  very  well  acquainted  with 
Henry  L.  Eyce  of  Cook  county,  Illinois,  who  acted  as  special  bailiff 
in  summoning  jurors  in  the  case  of  the  People,  etc.,  vs.  Spies  et  al., 
indictment  for  murder,  tried  in  the  criminal  court  of  Cook  county  in 
the  summer  of  1886.  That  affiant  was  himself  summoned  by  said 
Ryce  for  a  juror  in  said  cause,  but  was  challenged  and  excused  there- 
in because  of  his  prejudice.  That  on  several  occasions  in  conversa- 
tion between  affiant  and  said  Eyce  touching  the  summoning  of  the 
jurors  by  said  Eyce,  and  while  said  Eyce  was  so  acting  as  special 
bailiff  as  aforesaid,  said  Eyce  said  to  this  affiant  and  to  other  persons 
in  affiant's  presence,  in  substance  and  effect  as  follows,  to-wit:  "I 
(meaning  said  Ryce)  am  managing  this  case,  (meaning  this  case 
against  Spies  et  al)  and  know  what  I  am  about.  Those  fellows  (mean- 
ing the  defendants,  Spies  et  al)  are  going  to  be  hanged  as  certain  as 
death.  I  am  calling  such  men  as  the  defendants  will  have  to  chal- 
lenge peremtorily  and  waste  their  time  and  challenges.  Then  they 
will  have  to  take  such  men  as  the  prosecution  wants."  That  affiant 
has  been  very  reluctant  to  make  any  affidavit  in  this  case,  having  no 


sympathy  with  anarchy  nor  relationship  to  or  personal  interest  in  the 
defendants  or  any  of  them,  and  not  being  a  socialist,  communist  or 
anarchist;  but  affiant  has  an  interest  as  a  citizen,  in  the  due  admin- 
istration of  the  law,  and  that  no  injustice  should  be  done  under 
judicial  procedure,  and  believes  that  jurors  should  not  be  selected 
with  reference  to  their  known  views  or  prejudices.  Affiant  further 
says  that  his  personal  relations  with  said  Eyce  were  at  said  time,  and 
for  many  years  theretofore  had  been  most  friendly  and  even  intimate, 
and  that  affiant  is  not  prompted  by  any  ill  will  toward  anyone  in 
making  this  affidavit,  but  solely  by  a  sense  of  duty  and  a  conviction 
of  \7hat  is  due  to  justice. 

Affiant  further  says  that  about  the  beginning  of  October,  1886, 
w.hen  the  motion  for  a  new  trial  was  being  argued  in  said  cases  be- 
fore Judge  Cary,  and  when,  as  he  was  informed,  application  was 
made  before  Judge  Gary  f©r  leave  to  examine  affiant  in  open  court, 
touching  the  matters  above  stated,  this  affiant  went  upon  request 
from  State's  Attorney  Grinnell  to  his  office  during  the  noon  recess  of 
the  court,  and  there  held  an  interview  with  said  Grinnell,  Mr.  Ing- 
ham  and  said  Eyce,  in  the  presence  of  several  other  persons,  includ- 
ing some  police  officers,  where  affiant  repeated  substantially  the  mat- 
ters above  stated,  and  the  said  Kyce  did  not  deny  affiant's  statements, 
and  affiant  said  that  "he  would  have  to  testify  thereto  if  summoned  as 
a  witness,  but  had  refused  to  make  an  affidavit  thereto,  and  affiant 
was  then  and  there  asked  and  urged  to  persist  in  his  refusal  and  to 
make  no  affidavit.  And  affiant  further  saith  not. 

OTIS  S.  FAVOR. 

Subscribed  and  sworn  to  before  me  this  7th  day  of  November,  A 
D.  1887. 

JULIUS  STERN, 

Notary  Public  in  and  for  said  County. 

So  far  as  shown  no  one 'connected  with  the  state's  attor- 
ney's office  has  ever  denied  the  statements  of  Mr.  Favor,  as 
to  what  took  place  in  that  office,  although  his  affidavit  was 
made  in  November,  1887. 


10 

As  to  Bailiff  Ryce,  it  appears  that  he  has  made  aaffi-n 
davit  in  which  he  denies  that  he  made  the  statements  sworn 
to  by  Mr.  Favor,  but  unfortunately  for  him,  the  record  of 
the  trial  is  against  him,  for  it  shows  conclusively  that  he 
summoned  only  the  class  of  men  mentioned  in  Mr.  Favor's 
affidavit.  According  to  the  record  981  men  were  examined 
as  to  their  qualifications  as  jurors,  and  most  of  them  were 
either  employers,  or  men  who  had  been  pointed  out  to  the 
bailiff  by  their  employer.  The  following,  taken  from  the 
original  record  of  the  trial,  are  fair  specimens  of  the  an- 
swers of  nearly  all  the  jurors,  except  that  in  the  following 
cases  the  court  succeeded  in  getting  the  jurors  to  say  that 
they  believed  they  could  try  the  case  fairly  notwithstanding 
their  prejudice: 

Examination  of  Jurors. 

William  Neil,  a  manufacturer,  was  examined  at  length; 
stated  that  he  had  heard  and*  read  about  the  Haymarket 
trouble,  and  believed  enough  of  what  he  had  so  heard  and 
read  to  form  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  defendants, 
which  he  still  entertained;  that  he  had  expressed  said  opinion, 
and  then  he  added:  "It  would  take  pretty  strong  evidence 
to  remove  the  impression  that  I  now  have.  I  conld  not  dis- 
miss it  from  my  mind;  could  not  lay  it  altogethee  aside  dur- 
ing the  trial.  I  believe  my  present  opinion,  based  upon 
what  I  have  heard  and  read,  would  accompany  me  through 
the  trial,  and  would  influence  me  in  determining  and  getting 
at  a  verdict,1' 


11 

He  was  challenged  by  the  defendants  on  the  ground 
of  being  prejudiced,  bat  the  court  then  got  him  to  say 
that  he  believed  he  could  give  a  fair  verdict  on  whatever 
evidence  he  should  hear,  and  thereupon  the  challenge  was 
overruled. 

H.  F.  Chandler:  In  the  stationery  business,  with  Skeen, 
Stuart  &  Co.,  said:  "I  was  pointed  out  to  the  deputy  sher- 
iff by  my  employer  to  be  summoned  as  a  juror."  He  then 
stated  that  he  had  read  and  talked  about  the  Haymarket 
trouble,  and  had  formed  and  frequently  expressed  an  opinion 
as  to  the  guilt  of  the  defendants,  and  that  he  believed  the 
statements  he  had  read  and  heard.  He  was  asked: 

Q.  Is  that  a  decided  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  the 
the  defendants? 

A.    It  is  a  decided  opinion,  yes,  sir. 

Q/    Your  mind  is  pretty  well  made  up  now   as  to  their 
guilt  or  innocence? 
A.    Yes,  sir. 

Q.  'Would  it  be  hard  to  change  your  opinion? 
A.    It    might    be    hard;    I    cannot    say.     I   don't  know 
whether  it  would  be  hard  or  not. 

He  was  challenged  by  the  defendants  on  the  ground  of 
being  prejudiced.  Then  the  court  took  him  in  hand  and 
examined  him  at  some  length  and  got  him  to  state  that  he 
believed  ho  could  try  the  case  fairly.  Then  the  challenge 
was  overruled. 


F.  L.  Wilson :  Am  a  manufacturer.  I  am  prejudiced 
and  have  formed  an  expressed  opinion;  that  opinion  would 
influence  me  in  rendering  a  verdict. 

He  was  challenged  for  cause,  but  was  then  examined  by 
the  court: 

Q.  Are  you  conscious  in  your  own  mind  of  any  wish 
or  desire  that  there  should  be  evidence  produced  in  this 
trial  which  should  prove  some  of  these  men,  or  any  of  them, 
to  be  guilty? 

A.     Well,  I  think  I  have. 

Being  further  pressed  by  the  court  he  said  that  the  only 
feeling  he  had  against  the  defendants  was  based  upon  having 
taken  it  for  granted  that  what  he  read  about  them  was,  in 
the  main,  true;  that  he  believed  that  sitting  as  a  juror  the 
effect  of  the  evidence  either  for  or  against  the  defendants 
would  be  increased  or  diminished  by  what  he  had  heard  or 
read  about  the  case.  Then,  on  being  still  further  "pressed 
by  the  court,  he  finally  said:  "Well,  I  feel  that  I  hope  that 

the  guilty  one  will  be   discovered  or   punished,  not  necessa- 

i 
rily  these  men." 

Q.     Are  you  conscious  of  any  other  wish  or  desire  about 
the  matter  than  that  the  actual  truth  may  be  discovered? 
A.    I  don't  think  I  am. 

Thereupon  the  challenge  was  overruled. 

George  N.  Porter,  grocer,  testified  that  he  had  formed 
and  expressed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  defendants 


13 

and  that  this  opinion,  he  thought,  would  bias  his  judgment; 
he  would  try  to  go  by  the  evidence  but  that  what  h«  had 
read  would  have  a  great  deal  to  do  with  his  verdict;  his 
mind,  he  said,  was  certainly  biased  now,  and  that  it  would 
take  a  great  deal  of  evidence  to  change  it.  He  was  chal- 
lenged for  cause  by  the  defendants;  was  examined  by  the 
court  and  said: 

I  think  what  I  have  heard  and  read  before  I  came  into 
court  would  have  some  influence  with  me,  but  the  court 
finally  got  him  to  say  he  believed  he  could  fairly  and  im- 
partially try  the  case  and  render  a  verdict^  according  to  law 
and  evidence,  and  that  he  would  try  to  do  so.  Thereupon 
the  court  overruled  the  challenge  for  cause.  Then  he  was 
asked  some  more  questions  by  the  defendants'  counsel  and 
among  other  things  said: 

Why,  we  have  talked  about  it  there  a  great  many  times 
and  I  have  always  expressed  my  opinion.  I  believe  what  I 
have  read  in  the  papers;  believe  that  the  parties  are  guilty. 
I  would  try  to  go  by  the  evidence,  but  in  this  case  it  would 
be  awful  hard  work  for  me  to  do  it. 

Ho  was  challenged  a  second  time  on  the  ground  of 
being  prejudiced;  was  then  again  taken  in  hand  by  tho 
court  and  examined  at  length,  and  finally  again  said  he  be- 
lieved he  could  try  the  case  fairly  on  the  evidence;  when 
the  challenge  for  cause  was  overruled  for  the  second  time. 

H.  N.  Smith,  hardware  merchant,  stated  among  other 
things  that  he  was  prejudiced  and  had  quite  a  decided 


14 

opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendants,  that 
he  had  expressed  his  opinion  and  still  entertained  it,  and 
candidly  stated  that  he  was  afraid  he  would  listen  a  little 
more  attentively  to  the  testimony  which  concurred  with  his 
opinion  than  the  testimony  on  the  other  side;  that  some  of 
the  policemen  injured  were  personal  friends  of  his.  He  was 
asked  these  questions: 

Q.     That  is,  you  would  be  willing  to  have  your  opinion 
strengthened  and  hate  very  much  to  have  it  dissolved? 
A.    I  would. 

Q.     Under  these    circumstances   do  you   think   that  you 
could  render  a  fair  and  impartial  verdict? 
A.    I  don't  think  I  could. 

Q.     You  think  you  would  be  prejudiced? 
A.     /  think  I  would   be   because  my  feelings  are  very 
bitter. 

Q.     Would  your  prejudice  in  any  way  influence  you  in 
coming  at  an  opinion,  in  arriving  at  a  verdictf 
A.     I  think  it  would. 

He  was  challenged  on  the  ground  of  being  prejudiced; 
was  interrogated  at  length  by  the  court,  and  was  brought  to 
say  he  believed  he  could  try  the  case  fairly  on  the  evidence 
produced  in  court.  Then  the  challenge  was  overruled. 

Leonard  Gould,  .wholesale  grocer,  was  examined  at 
length;  said  he  had  a  decided  prejudice  against  the  defend- 
ants. Among  other  things  he  said:  "I  really  don't  know 


15 

that  I  could  do  the  case  justice;  if  I  was  to  sit  on  the  case 
I  should  just  give  my  undivided  attention  to  the  evidence 
and  calculate  to  be  governed  by  that."  He  was  challenged 
for  cause  and  the  challenge  overruled.  He  was  then  asked 
the  question  over  again,-  whether  he  could  render  an  impar- 
tial verdict  based  upon  the  evidence  alone,  that  would  be 
produced  in  court,  and  he  answered:  ""Well,  I  answered 
that  as  far  as  I  could  answer  it." 

Q.  You  say  you  don't  know  that  you  can  answer  that 
either  yes  or  no? 

A.     No,  I  don't  know  that  I  can. 

Thereupon  the  court  proceeded  to  examine  him,  endeavor- 
ing to  get  him  to  state  that  he  believed  he  could  try  the 
case  fairly  upon  the  evidence  that  was  produced  in  court, 
part  of  the  examination  being  as  follows: 

Q.  Now,  do  you  believe  that  you  can — that  you  have 
sufficiently  reflected  upon  it — so  as  to  examine  your 
own  mind,  that  you  can  fairly  and  impartially  determine  the 
guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendants? 

A.     That  is  a  difficult  question  for  me  to  answer. 

Q.  Well,  make  up  your  mind  as  to  whether  you  can 
render,  fairly  and  impartially  render,  a  verdict  in  accord- 
ance with  the  law  and  the  evidence.  Most  men  in  business 
possibly  have  not  gone  through  a  metaphysical  examination 
BO  as  io  be  prepared  to  answer  a  question  of  this  kind. 

A.     Judge,  I  don't  believe  I   can  answer  that  question. 


16 

Q.     Can  you  answer  whether  you  believe  you  know? 
A.     If  I  had  to  do  that  I  should  do  the  best  I  could. 

Q.  The  question  is  whether  you  believe  you  could  or 
not?  I  suppose,  Mr.  Gould,  that  you  know  the  law  is  that 
no  man  is  to  be  convicted  of  any  offense  with  which  he  is 
charged  unless  the  evidence  proves  that  he  is  guilty  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt? 

A.     That  is  true. 

Q.     The  evidence  heard  in  this  case  in  court? 
A.    Yes. 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that  you  can  render  a  verdict  in 
accordance  with  the  law? 

A.     Well,  I  don't  know  that  I  could. 

Q.     Do  you  believe  that  you  can't — if  you  don't  know  of 
any  reason  why  you  cannot,  do  you  believe  that  you  can't? 
A.     I  can  not  answer  that  question. 

Q.  Have  you  a  belief  one  way  or  other  as  to  whether 
you  can  or  can  not?  Not  whether  you  are  going  to  do  it, 
but  do  you  believe  you  can  not?  That  is  the  only  thing. 
You  are  not  required  to  state  what  is  going  to  happen  next 
week  or  week  after,  but  what  do  you  believe  about  yourself, 
whether  you  can  or  can't? 

A.     I  am  about  where  I  was  when  I  started. 

Some    more    questions    were    asked   and   Mr.  Gould  an- 


17 

Well,    I    believe    I    have    gone   just    as  far  as  I  can  in 

reply  to  that  question. 

Q.  This  question,  naked  and  simple  of  itself  is,  do  you 
believe  that  you  can  fairly  and  impartially  render  a  verdict 
in  the  case  in  accordance  with  the  law  and  evidence? 

A.     I  believe  I  could. 

Having  finally  badgered  tho  juror  into  giving  this  last 
answer,  tho  court  desisted.  The  defendants'  counsel  asked: 

Do  you  believe  you  can  do  so  uninfluenced  by  any  pre- 
judice or  opinion  which  you  now  have? 

A.  You  bring  it  at  a  point  that  I  object  to  and  I  do 
not  feel  competent  to  answer. 

Thereupon  the  juror  was  challenged  a  second  time  for 
cause,  and  the  challenge  was  overruled. 

James  H.  Walker,  dry  goods  merchant,  stated  that  he 
had  formed  and  expressed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  de_ 
fendants;  that  he  was  prejudiced,  and  stated  that  his  preju- 
dice would  handicap  hini. 

Q.  Considering  all  prejudice  and  all  opinions  that  you 
have,  if  the  testimony  was  equally  balanced,  would  you  de- 
cide one  way  or  the  other  in  accordance  with  that  opinion 
or  your  prejudice? 

A.  If  the  testimony  was  equally  balanced,  I  should 
hold  my  present  opinion,  sir. 


18 

Q.  Assuming  that  your  present  opinion  is,  that  you  be- 
lieve the  defendants  guilty,  would  you  believe  your  present 
opinion  would  warrant  you  in  convicting  them? 

A.     I  presume  it  would. 

Q.  Well,  you  believe  it  would;  that  is  your  present 
belief,  is  it. 

A.     Yes,  sir. 

He  was  challenged  on  the  ground  of  prejudice. 

The  court  then  examined  him  at  length,  and  finally  asked: 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that  you  can  sit  here  and  fairly  and 
impartially  make  up  your  mind,  from  the  evidence,  whether 
that  evidence  proves  that  they  are  guilty  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt  or  not? 

A.  I  think  I  could,  but  I  should  believe  that  I  was  a 
little  handicapped  in  my  judgment,  sir. 

Thereupon  the  court,  in  the  presence  of  the  jurors  no^ 
yet  examined,  remarked: 

Well,  that  is  a  sufficient  qualification  for  a  juror  in  the 
case — of  course,  the  more  a  man  feels  that  he  is  handicapped 
the  more  he  will  be  guarded  against  it. 

"W.  B.  Allen,  wholesale  rubber  business,  stated  among 
other  things: 

Q.  I  will  ask  you  whether  what  you  have  formed  from 
what  you  read  and  heard  is  a  slight  impression  or  an  opinion, 
or  a  conviction? 


19 

A.     It  is  a  decided  conviction. 

Q.  You  have  made  up  your  mind  as  to  whether  these 
men  are  guilty  or  innocent? 

A.     Yes,  sir. 

Q.  It  would  be  difficult  to  change  that  conviction,  or 
impossible,  perhaps? 

A.     Fes,  sir. 

Q.     It   would    be  impossible  to  change  your  conviction? 

A.     It  would  be  hard  to  change  my  conviction. 

He  was  challenged  for  cause  by  defendants.  Then  he 
was  examined  by  the  court  at  length  and  finally  brought  to 
the  point  of  saying  that  he  could  try  the  case  fairly  and 
impartially  and  would  do  BO.  Then  the  challenge  for  cause 
was  overruled. 

H.  L .  Anderson  was  examined  at  length  and  stated  that 
he  had  formed  and  expressed  an  opinion,  still  held  it,  was 
prejudiced,  but  that  he  could  lay  aside  his  prejudices  and 
grant  a  fair  trial  upon  the  evidence..  On  being  further  ex- 
amined he  said  that  some  of  the  policemen  injured  were 
friends  of  his  and  he  had  talked  with  them  fully.  He  had 
formed  an  unqualified  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence 
of  the  defendants,  which  he  regarded  as  deep-seated,  a  firm 
conviction  that  these  defendants,  or  some  of  them,  were 
guilty.  He  was  challenged  on  the  ground  of  prejudice,  but 
the  challenge  was  overruled. 


20 

M.  D.  Flavin,  in  the  marble  business.  He  had  read 
and  talked  about  the  Haymarket  trouble  and  had  formed 
and  expressed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of 
the  defendants,  which  he  still  held  and  which  was  very 
strong;  further,  that  one  of  the  officers  killed  at  the  Hay- 
market  was  a  relative  of  his,  although  the  relationship  was 
distant,  but  on  account  of  this  relationship  his  feelings  were 
perhaps  different  from  what  they  would  have  been,  and 
occasioned  a  very  strong  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  de- 
fendants, and  that  he  had  stated  to  others  that  he  believed 
what  he  had  heard  and  read  about  the  matter.  He  was 
challenged  on  the  ground  of  prejudice  and  then  stated,  in 
answer  to  a  question  from  the  prosecution,  that  he  believed 
that  he  could  give  a  fair  and  impartial  verdict,  when  the 
challenge  was  overruled. 

Rush  Harrison,  in  the  silk  department  of  Edson,  Keith 
&  Co.,  was  examined  at  length;  stated  that  he  had  a  deep- 
rooted  conviction  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defend- 
ants. He  said: 

"It  would  have  considerable  weight  with  me  if  selected 
as  a  juror.  It  is  pretty  deep-rooted,  that  opinion  is,  and  it 
would  take  a  large  preponderance  of  evidence  to  remove  it; 
it  would  require  the  preponderance  of  evidence  to  remove 
the  opinion  I  now  possess.  I  feel  like  every  other  good 
citizen  does.  I  feel  that  these  men  are  guilty;  we  don't  know 
which;  we  have  formed  this  opinion  by  general  reports  from 
the  newspapers.  Now,  with  that  feeling,  it  would  take  some 


21 

very  positive  evidence  to  make  me  think  these  men  were  not 
guilty,  if  I  should  acquit  them;  'that  is  what  I  mean.  I 
should  act  entirely  upon  the  testimony;  I  would  do  as  near 
as  the  main  evidence  would  permit  me  to  do.  Probably  I 
would  take  the  testimony  alone." 

Q.  But  you  say  that  it  would  take  positive  evidence  of 
their  innocence  before  you  could  consent  to  return  them  not 
guilty! 

A.     Fes,  I  should  want  some  strong  evidence. 

Q,  Well,  if  that  strong  evidence  of  their  innocence 
was  not  introduced,  then  you  want  to  convict  them,  of 
course? 

A.     Certainly. 

He  was  then  challenged  on  the  ground  of  being  preju- 
diced, when  the  judge  pioceeded  to  interrogate  him  and 
finally  got  him  to  say  that  he  believed  he  could  try  the 
case  fairly  on  the  evidence  alone;  then  the  challenge  was 
overruled. 

J.  R.  Adams,  importer,  testified  that  he  was  prejudiced; 
had  formed  and  expressed  opinions  and  still  held  them.  He 
was  challenged  on  this  ground,  when  the  court  proceeded  to 
examine  him  at  length,  and  finally  asked  him  this  question: 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that  your  convictions  as  to  what  the 
evidence  proved,  or  failed  to  prove,  will  be  at  all  affected  by 
what  anybody  at  all  said  or  wrote  about  the  matter  before? 

A.     I  believe  they  would. 


22 

The  court  (in  the  hearing  of  other  jurors  not  yet  exam- 
ined) exclaimed:  "It  is  incomprehensible  to  me."  The 
juror  was  excused. 

B.  L.  Ames,  dealer  in  hats  and  caps,  stated  that  he  was 
prejudiced;  had  formed  and  expressed  opinions;  still  held 
them.  He  was  challenged  on  these  grounds.  Then  the  court 
examined  him  at  length;  tried  to  force  him  to  say  that  he 
could  try  the  case  fairly  without  regard  to  his  prejudice, 
but  he  persisted  in  saying,  in  answer  to  the  court's  ques- 
tions, that  he  did  not  believe  that  he  could  sit  as  a  juror, 
listen  to  the  evidence  and  from  that  alone  make  up  his  mind 
as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendants.  Thereupon 
the  court,  in  the  presence  of  other  jurors  not  yet  examined, 
lectured  him  as  follows: 

"  Why  not?  What  is  to  prevent  your  listening  to  the 
evidence  and  acting  alone  upon  itf  Why  can't  you  listen 
to  the  evidence  and  make  up  your  mind  on  it? 

But  the  juror  still  insisted  that  he  could  not  do  it,  and 
was  discharged. 

H.  D.  B:  gardus,  flour  merchant,  stated  that  he  had  read 
and  talked  about  the  Hay  market  trouble;  had  formed  and 
expressed  an  opinion,  still  held  it,  as  to  the  guilt  or  inno- 
CQnce  of  the  defendants;  that  he  was  prejudiced;  that  this 
prejudice  would  certainly  influence  his  verdict  if  selected  a 
juror.  "/  don't  believe  that  I  could  give  them  a  fair  trial 
upon  the  proof,  for  it  would  require  very  strong  proof  to 


23 

overcome  my  prejudice.  I  hardly  think  that  you  could  bring 
proof  enough  to  change  my  opinion"  He  was  challenged  on 
the  ground  of  prejudice. 

Then  the  court  took  him  in  hand  and  after  a  lengthy 
examination  got  him  to  say:  "I  think  I  can  fairly  and  im- 
partially render  a  verdict  in  this  case  in  accordance  with 
the  law  and  the  evidence." 

Then  the  challenge  was  overruled. 

Counsel  for  defendants  then  asked  the  juror  further 
questions  and  he  replied:  "I  say  it  would  require  pretty 
strong  testimony  to  overcome  my  opinion  at  the  present 
time;  still,  I  think  I  could  act  independent  of  my  opinion. 
I  would  stand  by  my  opinion,  however,  and  I  think  that  the 
preponderance  of  proof  would  have  to  be  strong  to  change 
my  opinion.  I  think  the  defendants  are  responsible  for  what 
occurred  at  the  Haymarket  meeting.  The  preponderance  of 
the  evidence  would  have  to  be  in  favor  of  the  defendants' 
innocence  with  me." 

Then  the  challenge  for  cause  was  renewed,  when  the 
court  remarked,  in  the  presence  of  jurors  not  yet  examined: 
"Every  fairly  intelligent  and  honest  man  when  he  comes  to 
investigate  the  question  originally  for  himself,  upon  authen- 
tic sources  of  information,  will,  in  fact,  make  his  opinion 
from  the  authentic  source,  instead  of  hearsay  that  he  heard 
before. 

The  court  then  proceeded  to  again  examine  the  juror, 
and  as  the  juror  persisted  in  saying  that  ho  did  not  believe 


24 

he  could   give    the    defendants    a   fair   trial,  was  finally  dis- 
charged. 

These  examinations  are  fair  specimens  of  all  of  them, 
and  show  conclusively  that  Bailiff  Ryce  carried  out  the 
threat  that  Mr.  Favor  swears  to.  Nearly  every  juror  called 
stated  that  he  had  read  and  talked  about  the  matter  and 
believed  what  he  had  heard  and  read,  and  had  formed  and 
expressed  an  opinion,  and  still  held  it,  as  to  the  guilt  or 
innocence  of  the  defendants;  that  he  was  prejudiced  against 
them;  that  that  prejudice  was  deep-rooted,  and  that  it  would 
require  evidence  to  remove  that  prejudice. 

A  great  many  said  they  had  been  pointed  out  to  the 
bailiff  by  their  employers  to  be  summoned  as  jurors.  Many 
stated  frankly  that  they  believed  the  defendants  to  be  guilty, 
and  would  convict  unless  their  opinions  were  overcome  by 
strong  proofs;  and  almost  every  one,  after  having  made  these 
statements,  was  examined  by  the  court  in  a  manner  to  force 
him  to  say  that  he  would  try  the  case  fairly  upon  the  evi- 
dence produced  in  court,  and  whenever  he  was  brought  to 
this  point  he  was  held  to  be  a  competent  juror,  and  the 
defendants  were  obliged  to  exhaust  their  challenges  on  men 
who  declared  in  open  court  that  they  were  prejudiced  and 
believed  the  defendants  to  be  guilty. 

The  Twelve  who  Tried  the  Case. 

The  twelve  jurors  whom  the  defendants  were  finally 
forced  to  accept,  after  the  challenges  were  exhausted,  were 
of  the  same  general  character  as  the  others,  and  a  number 


25 

of  them  stated  candidly  that  they  were  so  prejudiced  that 
they  could  not  try  the  case  fairly,  but  each,  when  examined 
by  the  court,  was  finally  induced  to  say  that  he  believed  he 
could  try  the  case  fairly  upon  the  evidence  that  was  pro- 
duced in  court  alone.  For  example: 

Theodore  Denker,  one  of  the  twelve:  "Am  shipping 
clerk  for  Henry  W.  King  &  Co.  I  have  read  and  talked 
about  the  Hay  market  tragedy,  and  have  formed  and  expressed 
an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendants  of 
the  crime  charged  in  the  indictment.  I  believe  what  I  read 
and  heard,  and  still  entertain  that  opinion." 

Q.  Js  that  opinion  such  as  to  prevent  you  from  render- 
ing an  impartial  verdict  in  the  case,  sitting  as  a  juror, 
under  the  testimony  and  the  law? 

A.     I  think  it  is. 

He  was  challenged  for  cause  on  ground  of  prejudice. 
Then  the  state's  attorney  and  the  court  examined  him  and 

finally  got  him  to  say  that  he  believed  he  could  try  the  case 

i 
fairly  upon  the  law  and  the  evidence,  and  the  challenge  was 

overruled.  He  was  then  asked  further  questions  by  the 
defendants'  counsel,  and  said: 

"I  have  formed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  defend- 
ants and  have  expressed  it.  We  conversed  about  the.  matter 
in  the  business  house  and  I  expressed  my  opinion  there; 
expressed  my  opinion  quite  frequently.  My  mind  was  made 
up  from  what  I  read  and  did  not  hesitate  to  speak  about  it." 


26 

Q.  Would  you  feel  yourself  in  any  way  governed  or 
bound  in  listening  to  the  testimony  and  determining  it  upon 
the  pre-judgment  of  the  case  that  you  had  expressed  to 
others  before? 

A.     Well  that  is  a  pretty  hard  question  to  answer. 

He  then  stated  to  the  court  that  he  had  not  expressed 
an  opinion  as  to  the  truth  of  the  reports  he  had  read,  and 
finally  stated  that  he  believed  he  could  try  the  case  fairly 
on  the  evidence. 

John  B.  Greiner,  another  one  of  the  twelve:  "Am  a 
clerk  for  the  Northwestern  railroad.  I  have  heard  and  read 
about  the  killing  of  Began  at  the  Haymarket  on  May  4, 
last,  and  have  formed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  inno- 
cence of  the  defendants  now  on  trial  for  that  crime.  It  is 
evident  that  the  defendants  are  connected  with  that  affair 
from  their  being  here." 

Q.     You  regard  that  as  evidence? 

A.  Well,  I  don't  know  exactly.  Of  course  I  would  ex- 
pect that  it  connected  them  or  they  would  not  be  here. 

* 

Q.  So,  then,  the  opinion  that  you  now  have  has  refer- 
ence to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  some  of  these  men,  or  all 
of  them? 

A.     Certainly. 

Q.  Now,  is  that  opinion  one  that  would  influence  your 
verdict  if  you  should  be  elected  as  a  juror  to  try  the  case? 

A.  I  certainly  think  it  would  effect  it  to  some  extent; 
I  don't  see  how  it  could  be  otherwise. 


27 

He  further  stated  that  there  had  been  a  strike  in  the 
freight  department  of  the  Northwestern  road,  which  affected 
the  department  he  was  in.  After  some  further  examination 
he  stated  that  he  thought  he  could  try  the  case  fairly  on 
the  evidence,  and  was  then  held  to  be  competent. 

G.  W.  Adams,  also  one  of  the  twelve:  "Am  traveling 
salesman;  have  been  an  employer  of  painters.  I  read  and 
talked  about  the  Haymarket  trouble  and  formed  an  opinion 
as  to  the  nature  and  character  of  the  crime  committed  there. 
I  conversed  freely  with  my  friends  about  the  matter." 

Q.  Did  you  form  an  opinion  at  the  time  that  the  de- 
fendants were  connected  with  or  responsible  for  the  commis- 
sion of  that  crimef 

A.     I  thought  some  of  them  were  interested  in  it,  yes. 

Q.     And  you  still  think  so? 
A.     Yes. 

9 

Q.  Nothing  has  transpired  in  the  interval  to  change 
your  mind  at  all,  I  suppose? 

A.     No,  sir. 

Q.  You  say  some  of  them,  that  is,  in  the  newspaper 
accounts  that  you  read,  the  names  of  some  of  the  defendants 
were  referred  to? 

A.     Yes,  sir. 

After  further  examination  he  testified  that  he  thought 
h*  could  try  the  case  fairly  on  the  evidence. 


H.  T.  Sanford,  another  one  of  the  twelve:  Clerk  for 
the  Northwestern  railroad,  in  the  freight  auditor's  office. 

Q.  Have  you  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence 
of  the  defendants  of  the  murder  of  Mathias  J.  Degan? 

A.    I  have. 

Q.  From  all  that  you  have  heard  and  that  you  have 
read,  have  you  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of 
the  defendants  of  throwing  the  bomb? 

A.    Yes,  sir;  I  have. 

Q.  Have  you  a  prejudice  against  socialists  and  com- 
munists? 

A.    Yes,  sir;  a  decided  prejudice. 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that  that  prejudice  would  influence 
your  verdict  in  this  case? 

A.  Well,  as  I  know  so  little  about  it,  it  is  a  pretty 
hard  question  to  answer.  I  have  an  opinion  in  my  own 
mind  that  the  defendants  encouraged  the  throwing  of  that 
bomb. 

Challenged  for  cause  on  the  ground  of  prejudice. 

On  further  examination,  stated  he  believed  he  could  try 
the  case  fairly  upon  the  evidence,  and  the  challenge  for 
cause  was  overruled. 

Upon  the  whole,  therefore,  considering  the  facts  brought 
to  light  since  the  trial,  as  well  as  the  record  of  the  trial 
and  the  answers  of  the  jurors  as  given  therein,  it  is  clearly 


29 


shown   that  while  the   counsel   for   defendants  agreed  to  it, 
Ryce   was   appointed   special  bailiff  at  the  suggestion  of  the 
state's  attorney,  and  that  he  did  summon  a  prejudiced  jury 
which  he    believed   would  hang  the  defendants,  and  further, 
that  the   fact  that  Kyce   was  summoning    only  that  kind  of 
men  was  brought  to  the  attention   of   the    court    before    the 
panel  was  full,  and  it  was   asked   to  stop  it,  but  refused  to 
pay  any  attention   to   the  matter,    but  permitted  Ryce  to  go 
on  and  then  forced  the  defendants  to  go  to  trial  before  this 
jury. 

While    no   collusion   is    proven   between   the   judge  and 
state's  attorney,  it  is  clearly  shown  that  after  the  verdict  and 
while  a  motion  for  a   new   trial   was  pending,    a  charge  was 
filed  in  court   that    Ryce   had  packed  the  jury,  and  that  the 
attorney  for   the   state   got   Mr.  Favor  to  refuse  to  make  an 
affidavit  bearing  on    this    point,    which  the  defendants  could 
use,  and  then  the  court  refused  to  take  any  notice  of  it  un- 
less the  affidavit  was  obtained,  although  it  was  informed  that 
Mr.    Favor    would   not  make  an  affidavit,  but  stood  ready  to 
come  into  court    and  make    a  full  statement  if  the  court  de- 
sired  him  to  do  so. 

These  facts  alone  would  call  for  executive  interferance, 
especially  as  Mr.  Favor's  affidavit  was  not  before  the  supreme 
court  at  the  time  it  considered  the  case. 


30 

Recent  Decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  as  to  Com- 
petency of  J\irors» 

II. 

The  second  point  urged  seemed  to  me  to  be  equally 
conclusive.  In  the  case  of  the  People  vs.  Coughlin,  known 
as  the  Cronin  case,  recently  decided,  the  supreme  court,  in 
a  remarkably  able  and  comprehensive  review  of  the  law  on 
this  subject,  says  among  other  things: 

"The  holding  of  this  and  other  courts  is  substantially 
uniform,  that  where  it  is  once  clearly  shown  that  there  ex- 
ists in  the  mind  of  the  juror,  at  the  time  he  is  called  to  the 
jury  Box,  a  fixed  and  positive  opinion  as  to  the  merits  of 
the  case,  or  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendant  he 
is  called  to  try,  his  statement  that  notwithstanding  such  opin- 
ion he  can  render  a  fair  and  impartial  verdict  according  to 
the  law  and  evidence,  has  little,  if  any,  tendency  to  establish 
his  impartiality.  This  is  so  because  a  juror  who  has  sworn 
to  have  in  his  mind  a  fixed  and  positive  opinion  as  to  the 
guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused  is  not  impartial,  as  a  mat- 
tor  of  fact.  *  *  * 

"It  is  difficult  to  see  how,  after  a  juror  has  avowed  a 
fixed  and  settled  opinion  as.  to  the  prisoner's  guilt,  a  court 
can  be  legally  satisfied  of  the  truth  of  his  answer  that  ho 
can  render  a  fair  and  impartial  verdict,  or  find  therefrom 
that  he  has  the  qualification  of  impartiality,  as  required  by 
the  constitution.  *  *  * 

•'Under  such  circumstances  it  is  idle  to  inquire  of  the 
jurors  whether  they  can  return  just  and  impartial  verdicts. 


81 

The  more  clear  and  positive  were  their  impressions  of  guilt, 
the  more  certain  they  may  be  that  they  can  act  impartially 
in  condemning  the  guilty  party.  They  go  into  the  box  in  a 
state  of  mind  that  is  well  calculated  to  givo  a  color  of  guilt 
to  all  the  evidence,  and  if  the  accused  escapes  conviction,  it 
will  not  be  because  the  evidence  has  not  established  guilt 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  but  because  an  accused  party 
condemned  in  advance,  and  called  upon  to  exculpate  himself 

before  a  prejudiced  tribunal,  has  succeeded  in  doing  so.  * 
#  #  * 

"To  try  a  cause  by  such  a  jury,  is  to  authorize  men, 
who  state  that  they  will  lean  in  their  finding  against  one  of 
the  parties,  unjustly  to  determine  the  rights  of  others,  and 
it  would  be  no  difficult  task  to  predict,  even  before  the  evi- 
dence was  heard,  the  verdict  that  would  be  rendered.  Nor 
can  it  be  said  that  instructions  from  the  court  would  correct 
the  bias  of  the  jurors  who  swear  they  incline  in  favor  of 
one  of  the  litigants.  *  *  * 

"Bontecou  (one  of  the  jurors  in  the  Cronin  case),  it  is 
true,  was  brought  to  make  answer  that  he  could  render  a 
fair  and  impartial  verdict  in  accordance  with  the  law  and 
the  evidence,  but  that  result  was  reached  only  after  a  singu- 
larly argumentative  and  persuasive  cross-examination  by  the 
court,  in  which  the  right  of  every  person  accused  of  crime 
to  an  impartial  trial  and  to  the  presumption  of  innocence  un- 
til proved  guilty  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  and  the  duty  of 
every  citizen,  when  summoned  as  a  juror,  to  lay  aside  all 
opinions  and  prejudices  and  accord  the  accused  such  trial* 


32 

was  set  forth  and  decanted  upon  at  length,  and  in  which  the 
intimation  was  very  clearly  made  that  a  juror  who  .could  not 
do  this  was  recreant  to  his  duty  as  man  and  a  citizen. 
Under  pressure  of  this  sort  of  cross-examination,  Bontecou 
seems  to  have  been  finally  brought  to  make  answer  in  such 
a  way  as  to  profess  an  ability  to  sit  as  an  impartial  juror, 
and  on  his  so  answering  he  was  pronounced  competent,  and 
the  challenge  as  to  him  was  overruled.  Whatever  may  be 
the  weight  ordinarily  dfle  to  statements  of  this  character  by 
jurors,  their  value  as  evidence  is  in  no  small  degree  impair- 
ed in  this  case  by  the  mode  in  which  they  were,  in  a  certain 
sense,  forced  from  the  mouth  of  the  juror.  The  theory 
seemed  to  be  that  if  a  juror  could  in  any  way  be  brought  to 
answer  that  he  could  sit  as  an  impartial  juror,  that  declar- 
ation of  itself  rendered  him  competent.  Such  a  view,  if  it 
was  entertained,  was  a  total  misconception  of  the  law.  *  *  * 

"It  requires  no  profound  knowledge  of  human  nature  to 
know  that  with  ordinary  men  opinions  and  prejudices  are 
not  amenable  to  the  power  of  the  will,  however  honest  the 
intention  of  the  party  may  bo  to  put  them  aside.  They  are 
likely  to  remain  in  the  mind  of  the  juror  in  spite  of  all  his 
efforts  to  get  rid  of  them,  warping  and  giving  direction  to 
his  judgment,  coloring  the  facts  as  they  are  developed  by 
the  evidence  and  exerting  an  influence  more  or  less  potent, 
though  it  be  unconsciously  to  the  juror  himself,  on  the  final 
result  of  his  deliberations.  To  compel  a  person  accused  of 
a  crime  to  be  tried  by  a  juror  who  has  prejudged  his  case  is 
not  to  give  him  a  fair  trial.  Nor  should  a  defendant  be 


compelled  to  rely,  as  his  security  for  the  impartiality  of  the 
jurors  by  whom  he  is  to  be  tried,  upon  the  restraining  and 
controlling  influence  upon  the  juror's  mind  of  his  oath  to 
render  a  true  verdict  according  to  the  law  and  the  evidence. 
His  impartiality  should  appear  before  he  is  permitted  to 
take  the  oath.  If  he  is  not  impartial  then,  his  oath  can  not 
be  relied  upon  to  make  him  so.  In  the  terse  and  expressive 
language  of  Lord  Coke,  already  quoted,  the  jury  should 
'stand  indifferent  as  he  stands  unsworn."5 

Applying  the  law  as  here  laid  down  in  the  Cronin  case 
to  tho  answers  of  the  jurors  above  given  in  the  present  case, 
it  is  vory  apparent  that  most  of  the  jurors  were  incompe- 
tent because  they  were  not  impartial,  for  nearly  all  of  them 
candidly  stated  that  they  were  prejudiced  against  the  defend- 
ants and  believed  them  guilty  before  hearing  the  evidence, 
and  tho  mere  fact  that  the  judge  succeeded,  by  a  singularly 
suggestive  examination,  in  getting  them  to  state  that  they 
believed  they  could  try  the  case  fairly  on  the  evidence,  did 
not  make  them  competent. 

It  is.  true  that  this  case  was  before  the  supreme  court, 
and  that  court  allowed  tho  verdict  to  stand,  and  it  is  also 
true  that  in  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  tho  court  in  the 
Cronin  case  an  effort  is  made  to  distinguish  that  case  from 
this  one,  but  it  is  evident  that  the  court  did  not  have  the 
record  of  this  case  before  it  when  it  tried  to  make  the  dis- 
tinction, and  the  opinion  of  the  minority  of  the  court  in  the 
Cronin  case  expressly  refers  to  this  case  as  being  exactly 
like  that  ono,  so  far  as  relates  to  the  competency  of  the 


34 

jurors.  The  answers  of  the  jurors  were  almost  identical  and 
tho  examinations  were  the  same.  The  very  things  which  the 
supreme  court  held  to  be  fatal  errors  in  the  Cronin  case 
constituted  the  entire  fabric  of  this  case,  so  far  as  relates  to 
the  competency  of  the  jury.  In  fact,  the  trial  judge  in  the 
Cronin  case  was  guided  by  the  rule  laid  down  in  this  case, 
yet  the  supreme  court  reversed  the  Cronin  case  because  two 
of  the  jurors  were  held  to  be  incompetent,  each  having  testi- 
fied that  he  had  read  and  talked  about  the  caso  and  had 
formed  and  expressed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  de- 
fendants; that  he  was  prejudiced;  that  he  believed  what  he 
had  read  and  that  his  prejudice  might  influence  his  verdict; 
that  his  prejudice  amounted  to  a  conviction  on  the  subject 
of  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendants,  but  each  finally 
said  that  he  could  and  would  try  the  case  fairly  on  the 
evidence  alone,  etc. 

A  careful  comparison  of  the  examination  of  these  two 
jurors  with  that  of  many  of  the  jurors  in  this  case  shows 
that  a  number  of  the  jurors  in  this  case  expressed  them- 
selves, if  anything,  more  strongly  against  the  defendants 
than  these  two  did,  and  what  is  still  more,  one  of  those 
summoned,  Mr.  M.  D.  Flavin,  in  this  case,  testified  not  only 
that  he  had  read  and  talked  about  the  case  and  had  formed 
and  expressed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the 
defendants,  that  he  was  bitterly  prejudiced,  but  further,  that 
he  was  related  to  one  of  tho  men  who  was  killed,  and  that 
for  that  reason  he  felt  more  strongly  against  the  defendants 
than  he  otherwise  might,  yet  he  was  held  to  be  competent 


35 

on   his   mere   statement   that  he  believed    he   could   try   the 
case  fairly  on  the  evidence. 

No  matter  what  the  defendants  were  charged  with,  they 
were  entitled  to  a  fair  trial,  and  no  greater  danger  could 
possibly  threaten  our  institutions  than  to  have  the  courts  of 
justice  run  wild  or  give  way  to  popular  clamor,  and  when 
the  trial  judge  in  this  case  ruled  that  a  relative  of  one  of 
the  men  who  was  killed  was  a  competent  juror,  and  this 
after  the  man  had  candidly  stated  that  he  was  deeply  pre- 
judiced and  that  his  relationship  caused  him  to  feel  more 
strongly  than  he  otherwise  might,  and  when  in  scores  of  in- 
stances he  ruled  that  men  who  candidly  declared  that  they 
believed  the  defendants  to  be  guilty;  that  this  was  a  deep 
conviction  and  would  influence  their  verdict,  and  that  it 
would  require  strong  evidence  to  convince  them  that  the  de- 
fendants were  innocent,  when  in  all  these  instances  the  trial 
judge  ruled  that  these  men  were  competent  jurors,  simply 
because  they  had,  under  his  adroit  manipulation,  been  led  to 
say  that  they  believed  they  could  try  the  case  fairly  on  the 
evidence,  then  the  proceedings  lost  all  semblance  of  a  fair 
trial. 

**  • 

Does  the  Proof  Show  Guilt? 

III. 

The  state  has  never  discovered  who  it  was  that  threw 
the  bomb  which  killed  the  policemen,  and  the  evidence 
does  not  show  any  connection  whatever  between  the  defend- 
ants and  the  man  who  did  throw  it.  The  trial  judge  in 


36 

overruling  the  motion  for  a  new  hearing,  and  again,  recently 
in  a  magazine  article,  used  this  language: 

"  The  conviction  has  not  gone  on  the  ground  that  they 
did  have  actually  any  personal  participation  in  the  par- 
ticular act  which  caused  the  death  of  Degan,  but  the  con- 
viction proceeds  upon  the  ground  that  they  had  generally, 
by  speech  and  print,  advised  large  classes  of  the  people, 
not  particular  individuals,  but  large  classes,  to  commit  mur- 
der, and  had  left  the  commission,  the  time  and  place  and 
when,  to  the  individual  will  and  whim,  or  caprice,  or 
whatever  it  may  be,  of  each  individual  man  who  listened  to 
their  advice,  and  that  in  consequence  of  that  advice,  in  pur- 
suance of  that  advice,  and  influenced  by  that  advice,  some- 
body not  known  did  throw  the  bomb  that  caused  Degaris 
death.  Now,  if  this  is  not  a  correct  principle  of  the  law, 
then  the  defendants  of  course  are  entitled  to  a  new  trial. 
This  case  is  without  precedent;  there  is  no  example  in  the 
law  books  of  a  case  of  this  sort." 

The  judge  certainly  told  the  truth  when  he  stated  that 
this  case  was  without  a  precedent,  and  that  no  example 
could  be  found  in  the  law  books  to  sustain  the  law  as  above 
laid  down.  For,  in  all  the  centuries  during  which  government 
has  been  maintained  among  men,  and  crime  has  been  pun- 
ished, no  judge  in  a  civilized  country  has  ever  laid  down 
such  a  rule  before.  The  petitioners  claim  that  it  was  laid 
down  in  this  case  simply  because  the  prosecution,  not  hav- 
ing discovered  the  real  criminal,  would  otherwise  not  have 


87 

been  able  to  convict  anybody;  that  this  course  was  then 
taken  to  appease  the  fury  of  the  public,  and  that  the  judg- 
ment was  allowed  to  stand  for  the  same  reason.  I  will  not 
discuss  this.  But  taking  the  law  as  above  laid  down,  it  was 
necessary  under  it  to  prove,  and  that  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  that  the  person  committing  the  violent  deed  had  at 
least  heard  or  read  the  advice  given  to  masses,  for  until  he 
either  heard  or  read  it  he  did  not  receive  it,  and  if  he  did 
not  receive  it,  he  did  not  commit  the  violent  act  in  pursuance 
of  that  advice;  and  it  is  here  that  the  case  for  the  state  fails; 
with  all  his  apparent  eagerness  to  force  conviction  in  court, 
and  his  efforts  in  defending  his  courso  since  the  trial,  the 
judge,  speaking  on  this  point  in  his  magazine  article,  makes 
this  statement:  "It  is  probably  true  that  Kudolph  Schnau- 
belt  threw  the  bomb,"  which  statement  is  a  mere  surmise 
and  is  all  that  is  known  about  it,  and  is  certainly  not 
sufficient  to  convict  eight  men  on.  In  fact,  until  the  state 
proves  from  whose  hands  the  bomb  came,  it  is  impossible 
to  show  any  connection  between  the  man  who  threw  it  and 
these  defendants. 

It  is  further  shown  that  the  mass  of  matter  contained  in 
the  record  and  quoted  at  length  in  the  judge's  magazine 
article,  showing  the  use  of  seditious  and  incendiary  language, 
amounts  to  but  little  when  its  source  is  considered.  The  two 
papers  in  which  articles  appeared  at  intervals  during 
years  were  obscuro  little  sheets  having  scarcely  any  circula- 
tion and  the  articles  themselves  were  written  at  times  of  great 
public  excitement  when  an  element  in  tho  community 


38 

claimed  to  have  been  outraged;  and  the  same  is  true  of  the 
speeches  made  by  the  defendants  and  others;  the  apparently 
seditious  utterances  were  such  as  are  always  heard  when 
men  imagine  that  they  have  been  wronged  or  are  excited  or 
partially  intoxicated;  and  the  talk  of  a  gigantic  anarchistic 
conspiracy  is  not  believed  by  the  then  chief  of  police,  as  will 
be  shown  hereafter,  and  it  is  not  entitled  to  serious  notice, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that,  while  Chicago  had  nearly  a  million 
inhabitants,  the  meetings  held  on  the  lake  front  on  Sundays 
during  the  summer  by  these  agitators  rarely  had  fifty  people 
present,  and  most  of  those  went  from  mere  curiosity,  while 
the  meetings  held  indoors  during  the  winter  were  still 
smaller.  The  meetings  held  from  time  to  time  by  the  masses 
of  the  laboring  people  must  not  be  confounded  with  the 
meetings  above  named,  although  in  times  of  excitement  and 
trouble  much  violent  talk  was  indulged  in  by  irresponsible 
parties,  which  was  forgotten  when  tho  excitement  was  over. 

Again,  it  is  shown  here  that  the  bomb  was,  in  all  prob- 
ability, thrown  by  some  one  seeking  personal  revenge;  that 
a  course  had  been  pursued  by  the  authorities  which  would 
naturally  cause  this;  that  for  a  number  of  years  prior  to 
the  Haymarket  affair  there  had  been  labor  troubles,  and  in 
several  cases  a  number  of  laboring  people,  guilty  of  no 
offense,  had  been  shot  down  in  cold  blood  by  Pinkerton  mm 
and  none  of  the  murderers  were  brought  to  justice.  The 
evidence  taken  at  coroners'  inquests  and  presented  here 
shows  that  in  at  least  two  cases  men  were  fired  on  and 
Jailed  when  they  were  running  away  and  there  was  conse- 


39 

quently  no  occasion  to  shoot,  yet  nobody  was  punished;  that 
in  Chicago  there  had  been  a  numbej*  of  strikes  in  which 
oome  of  the  police  not  only  took  sides  against  the  men,  but 
without  any  authority  of  law  invaded  and  broke  up  peace- 
able meetings,  and  in  scores  of  cases  brutally  clubbed  people 
who  were  guilty  of  no  offense  whatever.  Reference  is  made 
to  the  opinion  of  the  late  Judge  McAllister  in  the  case  of 
the  Harmonia  Association  of  Joiners  against  Brenan  et  al., 
reported  in  the  Chicago  Legal  News.  Among  other  things 
Judge  McAllister  says: 

"The  facts  established  by  a  large  number  of  witnesses 
and  without  any  opposing  evidence  are,  that  this  society, 
having  leased  Turner  Hall,  on  West  Twelfth  street  for  the 
purpose,  held  a  meeting  in  the  forenoon  of  said  day  in  said 
hall  composed  of  from  200  to  300  individuals,  most  of  whom 
were  journeymen  cabinet  makers  engaged  in  the  several 
branches  of  the  manufacture  of  furniture  in  Chicago,  but 
some  of  those  in  attendance  were  the  proprietors  in  that 
business  or  delegates  sent  by  them.  The  object  of  the 
meeting  was  to  obtain  a  conference  of  the  journeymen  with 
such  proprietors  or  their  authorized  delegates  with  the 
view  of  endeavoring  to  secure  an  increase  of  the  price  or 
diminution  of  the  hours  of  labor.  The  attendants  were 
wholly  unarmed  and  the  meeting  was  perfectly  peaceable 
and  orderly,  and  while  the  people  were  sitting  quietly  with 
their  backs  toward  the  entrance  hall,  with  a  few  persons  on 
the  stage  in  front  of  them,  and  all  engaged  merely  in  the 
business  for  which  they  had  assembled,  a  force  of  from 


40 

fifteen  to  twenty  policemen  came  suddenly  into  the  hall, 
having  a  policeman's  *club  in  one  hand  and  a  revolver  in 
the  other,  and  making  no  pause  to  determine  the  actual 
character  of  the  meeting,  they  immediately  shouted:  "Get 
out  of  here,  you  damned  sons-of-bitches,"  and  began  beating 
the  people  with  their  clubs,  some  of  them  actually  firing 
their  revolvers.  One  young  man  was  shot  through  the  back 
of  the  head  and  killed.  But  to  complete  the  atrocity  of  the 
affair  on  the  part  of  the  officers  engaged  in  it,  when  the 
people  hastened  to  make  their  escape  from  the  assembly 
room,  they  found  policemen  stationed  on  either  side  of  the 
stairway  leading  from  the  hall  down  to  the  street,  who 
applied  their  clubs  to  them  as  they  passed,  seemingly  with 
all  the  violence  practicable  under  the  circumstances. 

"Mr;  Jacob  Beiersdorf,  who  was  a  manufacturer  of  fur- 
niture, employing  some  200  men,  had  been  invited  to  the 
meeting  and  came,  but  as  he  was  about  to  enter  the  place 
where  it  was  held,  an  inoffensive  old  man,  doing  nothing  un- 
lawful, was  stricken  to  the  ground  at  his  feet  by  a  police- 
man's club. 

"These  general  facts  were  established  by  an  overwhelm- 
ing mass  of  testimony,  and  for  the  purpose  of  the  questions 
in  the  case,  it  is  needless  to  go  farther  into  detail. 

"The  chief  political   right  of  the    citizen  in  our   govern- 
ment, based   upon  the  popular   will    as  regulated  by   law,  is 
the  right  of  suffrage,  but  to  that  right  two  others  are  auxil- 
ary  and  of  almost  equal  importance: 


41 

"1.     The  right  of  free  speech  and  of  a  free  press. 

"2.  The  right  of  the  people  to  assemble  in  a  peaceable 
manner  to  consult  for  the  common  good. 

"These  are  among  the  fundamental  principles  of  govern- 
ment and  guaranteed  by  our  constitution.  Section  17,  article 
2  of  the  bill  of  rights  declare^:  'The  people  have  a  right 
to  assemble  in  a  peaceable  manner  to  consult  for  the  com- 
mon good,  to  make  known  their  opinions  to  their  representa- 
tives and  apply  for  redress  of  grievances.  Jurists  do  not  re- 
gard these  declarations  of  the  bill  of  rights  as  creating  or 
conferring  the  rights,  but  as  a  guarantee  against  their  de- 
privation or  infringement  by  any  of  the  powers  or  agencies 
of  the  government.  The  rights  themselves  are  regarded  as 
the  natural  inalienable  rights  belonging  to  every  individual, 
or  as  political  and  based  upon  or  arising  from  principles  in- 
herent in  the  very  nature  of  a  system  of  free  government.' 

"The  right  of  the  people  to  assemble  in  a  peaceable 
manner  to  consult  for  the  common  good  being  a  constitutional 
right,  it  can  be  exercised  and  enjoyed  within  the  scope  and 
spirit  of  that  provision  of  the  constitution,  independently  of 
every  other  power  of  the  state  government. 

"Judge  Oooley,  in  his  excellent  work  on  'Torts,'  speak- 
ing (p.  296)  of  remedies  for  the  invasion  of  political  rights, 
says:  'When  a  meeting  for  any  lawful  purpose  is  actually 
called  and  held  one  who  goes  there  with  the  purpose  to  dis- 
turb and  break  it  up  and  commits  disorder  to  that  end,  is  a 
trespasser  upon  the  rights  of  those  who,  for  a  time,  have 


42 

control  of  the  place  of  meeting.     If  several  unite  in  the  dis- 
order it  may  be  a  criminal  riot.'  " 

So  much  for  Judge  McAlister. 

Now,  it  is  shown  that  no  attention  was  paid  to  the 
judge's  decision;  that  peaceable  meetings  were  invaded  and 
broken  up  and  inoffensive  people  were  clubbed;  that  in  1885 
there  was  a  strike  at  the  McCormick  Reaper  factory  on  ac- 
count of  a  reduction  in  wages  and  some  Pinkerton  men, 
while  on  their  way  there,  were  hooted  at  by  some  people  on 
the  street,  when  they  fired  into  the  crowd  and  fatally 
wounded  several  people  who  had  taken  no  part  in  any  dis- 
turbance; that  four  of  the  Pinkerton  men  were  indicted  for 
this  murder  by  the  grand  jury,  but  that  the  prosecuting 
officers  apparently  took  no  interest  in  the  case  and  allowed 
it  to  be  continued  a  number  of  times,  until  the  witnesses 
were  sworn  out,  and  in  the  end  the  murderers  went  free; 
that  after  this  there  was  a  strike  on  the  West  Division 
Street  railway  and  that  some  of  the  police,  under  the  lead- 
ership of  Oapt.  John  Bonfield,  indulged  in  a  brutality  never 
equaled  before;  that  even  small  merchants  standing  on  their 
own  doorsteps  and  having  no  interest  in  the  strike  were 
clubbed,  then  hustled  into  patrol  wagons  and  throAvn  into 
prison  on  no  charge  and  not  even  booked;  that  a  petition, 
signed  by  about  1,000  of  the  leading  citizens  living  on  and 
near  West  Madison  street,  was  sent  to  the  mayor  and  city 
council,  praying  for  the  dismissal  of  Bonfield  from  the  force 
but  that  on  'account  of  his  political  influence  he  was  re- 
tained. Let  me  say  here  that  the  charge  of  brutality  does 


43 

not  apply  to  all  of  the  policemen  of  Chicago.  There  are 
many  able,  honest  and  conscientious  officers  who  do  their 
duty  quietly,  thoroughly  and  humanely. 

As  a  specimen  of  the  many  papers  filed  in  this  connec- 
tion I  will  give  the  following,  the  first  being  from  the  offi- 
cers of  a  corporation  that  is  one  of  the  largest  employers  in 
Chicago: 

OFFICE  PEOPLE'S  GAS  LIGHT  AND  COKE  Co., 

CHICAGO,  Nov.  21,  1885. 

To  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee,  Chicago  Trades  and  Labor  As- 
sembly : 

Sir— In  response  to  the  request  of  your  committee  for  informa- 
tion as  to  the  treatment  received  by  certain  employes  of  this  com- 
pany at  the  hands  of  Captain  Boufield,  and  by  his  orders,  during  the 
strike  of  the  Western  Division  Railway  Company's  employes  in  July 
last,  you  are  advised  as  follows: 

On  that  day  of  the  strike,  in  which  there  was  apparently  an  in- 
discriminate arresting  of  persons  who  happened  to  be  up  on  Madison 
street,  whether  connected  with  the  disturbance  of  peace  or  engaged 
in  legitimate  business,  a  number  of  employes  of  this  company  were 
at  work  upon  said  street  near  Iloyne  avenue,  opening  a  trench  for 
the  laying  of  gas  pipe. 

The  tool  box  of  the  employes  was  at  the  southeast  corner  of 
Hoyne  and  Madison  street.  As  the  men  assembled  for  labor  shortly 
before  7  a.  m.,  they  took  their  shovels  and  tools  from  the  tool  box,  ar- 
ranged themselves  along  the  trench  preparatory  to  going  to  work 
when  the  hour  of  seven  should  arrive.  About  this  time  and  a  little 
before  the  men  began  to  work  a  crowd  of  men,  not  employes  of  this 
company,  came  surging  down  the  street  from  the  west,  and  seizing 
such  shovels  and  other  tools  of  the  men  as  lay  upon  the  ground  and 
about  the  box,  threw  more  or  less  of  the  loose  dirt,  which  before  had 
been  taken  from  the  trench,  upon  the  track  of  the  railway  company. 
A-bout  this  time  Captain  Bonfleld  and  his  force  appeared  upon  the 


44 

scene  and  began  apparently  an  indiscriminate  arrest  of  persona. 
Among  others  arrested  were  the  following  employes  of  this  company: 
Edward  Kane,  Mike  W.  Kerwin,  Dan  Diamond,  Jas.  Hussey,  Dennis 
Murray,  Patrick  Brown  and  Pat  Franey.  ~N"o  one  of  these  persons 
had  any  connection  with  the  strike,  or  were  guilty  of  obstructing  the 
cars  of  the  railway  company,  or  of  any  disturbance  upon  the  street. 
Mr.  Kerwin  had  just  arrived  at  the  tool  box  and  had  not  yet  taken 
his  shovel  preparatory  to  going  to  work,  when  he  was  arrested  while 
standing  by  the  box  and  without  resistance  was  put  upon  a  street 
car  as  prisoner.  When  upon  the  car  he  called  to  a  friend  among  the 
workmen,  saying,  "take  care  of  my  shovel."  Thereupon  Bonfield 
struck  him  a  violent  blow  with  a  club  upon  his  head,  inflicting  a  ser- 
ious wound,  laying  open  his  scalp,  and  saying  as  he  did  so,  "I  will 
shovel  you,"  or  words  to  that  effect.  Another  of  the  said  employes, 
Edward  Kane,  was  also  arrested  by  the  tool  box,  two  of  the  police 
seizing  him,  one  by  each  arm,  and  he  was  being  put  upon  the.  car,  a 
third  man,  said  by  Kane  and  others  to  be  Bonfield,  struck, 
him  with  a  club  upon  the  head,  severely  cutting  his  head.  Both 
of  these  men  were  seriously  injured  and  for  a  time  disabled 
from  attending  to  their  business.  Both  of  these  men,  with 
blood  streaming  from  cuts  upon  their  heads,  respectively,  as 
also  all  of  the  others  above  named,  were  hustled  off  to  the  police 
station  and  locked  up.  The  men  were  not  "booked"  as  they  were 
locked  up,  and  their  friends  had  great  difficulty  in  finding  them,  so 
that  bail  might  be  offered  and  they  released.  After  they  were  found 
communication  with  them  was  denied  for  some  time,  by  Bonfield's 
orders  it  was  said,  and  for  several  hours  they  were  kept  in  confine- 
ment in  the  lock-up  upon  Desplaines  Street  as  criminals,  when  their 
friends  were  desirous  of  bailing  them  out.  Subsequently  they  were 
all  brought  up  for  trial  before  Justice  White.  Upon  the  hearing  the 
city  was  represented  by  its  attorney,  Bonfield  himself  being  present, 
and  from  the  testimony  it  appeared  that  all  these  men  had  been  ar- 
rested under  the  circumstances  aforesaid,  and  without  the  least  cause, 
and  that  Kane  and  Kirwin  had  been  cruelly  assaulted  and  beaten 
without  the  least  justification  therefor,  and  of  course  they  were  all 
discharged. 


45 

The  officers  of  this  company  who  are  cognizant  of  the  outrages  per- 
petrated upon  these  men,  feel  that  the  party  by  whom  the  same  were 
committed  ought  not  to  remain  in  a  responsible  position  upon  the 

police  force. 

PEOPLE'S  GAS  LIGHT  AND  COKE  Co., 
By  C.  K.  G.  Billings,  V.  P. 

CHICAGO,  Nov.  19,  1885. 
EGBERT  ELLIS,  974  "West  Madison  street: 

I  kept  a  market  at  974  West  Madison  street.  I  was  in  my  place  of 
business  waiting  on  customers  and  stepped  to  the  door  to  get  a  measure 
of  vegetables.  The  first  thing  I  knew,  as  I  stood  on  the  step  in  front  of 
my  store,  I  received  a  blow  over  the  shoulders  with  a  club  and  was 
seized  and  thrown  off  the  sidewalk  into  a  ditch  being  dug  there.  I  had 
my  back  to  the  person  who  struck  me,  but  on  regaining  my  feet  I  saw 
that  it  was  Bonfield  who  had  assaulted  me.  Two  or  three  officers  then 
came  up.  I  told  them  not  to  hit  me  again.  They  said  go  and  get  in  the 
car,  and  I  told  them  that  I  couldn't  leave  my  place  of  business  as  I  was 
all  alone  there.  They  asked  Bonfield  and  he  said,  "Take  him  right  along." 
They  then  shoved  me  into  the  car  and  took  me  down  the  street  to  a 
patrol  wagon,  in  which  I  was  taken  to  the  Lake  street  station.  I  was 
locked  up  there  from  this  time,  about  8  o'clock  in  the  morning,  till  8 
o'clock  in  the  evening  and  then  taken  to  the  Desplaines  street  station. 
I  was  held  there  a  short  time  and  then  gave  bail  for  my  appearance,  and 
got  back  to  my  place  of  business  about  9  o'clock  that  -night.  Subse- 
quently when  I  appeared  in  court  I  was  discharged.  It  was  about  S 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  July  3, 1885,  when  I  was  taken  from  my  place  of 
business.  ROBERT  ELLIS. 

W.  W.  WYMAN: 

CHICAGO,  Nov.  19,  1385. 

I  was  standing  in  my  door  about  7  o'clock  in  the  morning  of 
July  3,  1885.  I  saw  a  man  standing  on  the  edge  of  the  sidewalk.  He 
wasn't  doing  anything  at  all.  Bonfield  came  up  to  him,  and  without 
a  word  being  said  by  either,  Bonfield  hit  him  over  the  head  with  his 
club  and  knocked  him  down.  He  also  hit  him  twice  after  he  had 
fallen.  I  was  standing  about  six  feet  from  them  when  the  assault 
occurred.  I  don't  know  the  man  that  was  clubbed — never  saw  him 
before  nor  since.  VW.  W.  WYMAN, 

1004  West  Madison  Street. 


46 

JESSE  CLOUD: 

CHICAGO,  Nov.  20,  1885. 

On  the  morning  of  July  3,  1885,  about  7  o'clock,  as  I  was  stand- 
ing on  the  southeast  corner  of  Madison  street  and  Western  avenue, 
I  saw  Bonfleld  walk  up  to  a  man  on  the  opposite  corner,  who  was 
apparently  looking  on  at  what  was  going  on  in  the  street.  Bonfiekl 
hit  him  over  the  head  with  his  club  and  knocked  him  down.  Some 
men  who  were  near  him  helped  him  over  to  the  drug  store  on  the 
corner  where  I  was  standing.  His  face  was  covered  with  blood  from 
the  wound  on  his  head  made  by  Bonfield's  club,  and  he  appeared  to 
be  badly  hurt.  A  few  moments  later,  as  I  was  standing  in  the  same 
place,  almost  touching  elbows  with  another  man,  Bonfield  came  up 
facing  us  and  said  to  us,  "siand  back,"  at  the  same  time  striking  the 
other  man  over  the  head  with  his  club.  I  stepped  back  and  turned 
around  to  look  for  the  other  man;  saw  him  a  few  feet  away  with 
the  blood  running  down  over  his  face,  apparently  badly  hurt  from 
the  effect  of  the  blow  or  blows  he  had  received  from  Bonfield. 
There  was  no  riot  or  disorderly  conduct  there  at  the  time,  except 
what  Bonfield  made  himself  by  clubbing  innocent  people  who  were 
taking  no  part  in  the  strike.  If  they  had  been  there  for  the  purpose 
of  rioting  they  would  surely  have  resisted  Bonfield's  brutality. 

I  affirm  that  the  above  statement  is  a  true  and  correct  statement 
of  facts. 

JESSE  CLOUD,  998  Monroe  street. 

H.  J.  NICHOLS: 

CHICAGO,  Nov.  19,  1885. 

On  the  morning  of  July  3, 1885, 1  was  driving  up  Madison  streeti 
just  coming  from  Johnson's  bakery  on  Fifth  avenue.  "When  I  got  to 
the  corner  of  Market  and  Madison  streets,  I  met  the  cars  coming  over 
the  bridge.  On  looking  out  of  my  wagon  I  saw  Bonfield  by  the  side  of 
a  car.  He  snatched  me  from  my  wagon  and  struck  me  on  the  head 
cutting  it  open,  and  put  me  in  a  car,  leaving  my  wagon  standing  there 
unprotected  loaded  with  bakery  goods,  all  of  which  were  stolen,  except 
a  few  loaves  of  bread.  I  was  taken  to  the  Desplaines  street  station  and 
locked  up  for  about  ten  hours.  I  was  then  bound  over  for  riot  in  $500 
bail  and  released.  During  the  time  I  was  there  I  received  no  attention 
of  any  kind,  though  my  head  was  seriously  cut.  Julius  Goldzier,  my 


47 

lawyer,  went  to  Bonfield  with  me  before  the  case  was  called  in  court, 
and  told  him  I  had  done  nothing,  and  Bonfleld  said,  "scratch  his  name 
off,"  and  I  was  released. 

I  swear  to  the  truth  of  the  above. 

Signed,  H.  J.  NICHOLS, 

47  Flournoy  street. 

The  following  is  from  Captain   Schaack,  a   very   promi- 
nent police  official: 

DEPARTMENT  or  POLICE, 

CITY  OF  CHICAGO. 

CHICAGO,  111.,  May  4,  1893. 
Mr.  G.  E.  DETWILER,  Editor  Rights  of  Labor: 

Dear  Sir:  In  reply  to  your  communication  of  April  13, 1  will  say 
that  in  July,  1885,  in  the  street  car  strike  on  the  west  side,  I  held  the 
office  of  lieutenant  on  the  force.  I  was  detailed  with  a  company  of 
officers  early  in  the  morning  in  the  vicinity  of  the  car  barns,  I  be- 
lieve on  Western  avenue  and  a  little  north  of  Madison  street.  My 
orders  were  to  see  that  the  new  men  on  the  cars  were  not  molested 
when  coming  out  of  the  barns. 

One  man  came  out  and  passed  my  lines  about  fifty  feet.  I  saw 
one  of  the  men,  either  driver  or  conductor,  leave  the  car  at  a  stand- 
still. I  ran  up  near  to  the  car,  when  I  saw  on  the  southeast  corner 
of  the  street  Bonfield  strike  a  man  on  the  head  with  his  club.  He 
hit  the  man  twice  and  I  saw  the  man  fall  to  the  ground. 

Afterwards  I  was  put  on  i,  *rr  n  of  cars,  protecting  the  rear. 
Bonfield  had  charge  of  the  front.  I  saw  many  people  getting  clubbed 
in  front  of  the  train  but  I  held  my  men  in  the  rear  and  gave  orders 
not  to  strike  any  one  except  they  were  struck  first.  Not  one  of  my 
officers  hurt  a  person  on  that  day  or  at  any  time. 

Many  people  were  arrested,  all  appearing.  From  what  I  saw  in 
the  afternoon  and  the  next  day,  no  officer  could  state  what  they  were 
arrested  for.  The  officers  professed  ignorance  of  having  any  evidence, 
but  "some  one  told  them  to  take  him  in,"  meaning  to  lock  him  up. 
On  that  afternoon,  about  4  o'clock,  I  met  Bonfield  and  he  addressed 


48 

me  In  the  following  words,  in  great  anger:  "If  some  of  you  goody- 
goody  fellows  had  used  your  clubs  freely  in  the  forenoon,  you  would 
not  need  to  use  lead  this  afternoon."  I  told  him  that  I  did  not  see 
any  use  clubbing  people  and  that  I  would  club  no  person  to  please 
any  one,  meaning  Bonfield,  and  that  if  lead  had  to  be  used,  I  thought 
my  officers  could  give  lead  and  take  it  also.  I  will  say  that  affair 
was  brutal  and  uncalled  for. 

MICHAEL  J.  SCHAACK, 
No.  227  N.  State  Street. 

Again  it  is  shown  that  various  attempts  were  made  to 
bring  to  justice  the  men  who  wore  the  uniform  of  the  law 
while  violating  it»  but  all  to  no  avail;  that  the  laboring 
people  found  the  prisons  always  open  to  receive  them,  but 
the  courts  of  justice  were  practically  closed  to  them;  that 
the  prosecuting  officers  vied  with  each  other  in  hunting 
them  down,  but  were  deaf  to  their  appeals;  that  in  the 
spring  of  1886  there  were  more  labor  disturbances  in  the 
city  and  particularly  at  the  McCormick  factory;  that  under 
the  leadership  of  Capt.  Bonfield  the  brutalities  of  the  previ- 
ous year  were  even  exceeded.  Some  affidavits  and  other 
evidence  13  offered  on  this  point  which  I  can  not  give  for 
want  of  space.  It  appears  that  this  was  the  year  of  the 
eight  hour  agitation  and  Efforts  were  made  to  secure  an 
eight  hour  day  about  May  1,  and  that  a  number  of  labor- 
ing men  standing,  not  on  the  street,  but  on  a  vacant  lot, 

• 

were  quietly  discussing  the  situation  in  regard  to  the  move- 
ment, when  suddenly  a  large  body  of  police  under  orders 
from  Bonfield  charged  on  them  and  began  to  club  them; 
that  some  of  the  men,  angered  at  the  unprovoked  assault, 
at  first  resisted,  but  were  soon  dispersed;  that  some  of  the 


49 

police  fired  on  the  men  Avhile  they  were  running  and  wounded 
a  large  number"  who  were  already  100  feet  or  more  away 
aod  were  running  as  fast  as  they  could;  that  at  least  four 
of  the  number  so  shot  down  died,  that  this  was  wanton  and 
unprovoked  murder,  but  there  was  not  even  so  much  as  an 
investigation. 

Was  it  an  Act  of  Personal  Revenge? 

While  some  men  may  tamely  submit  to  being  clubbed 
and  seeing  their  brothers  shot  down,  there  are  some  who 
will  resent  it  and  will  nurture  a  spirit  of  hatred  and  seek 
revenge  for  themselves,  and  the  occurrences  that  preceded 
the  Haymarket  tragedy  indicate  that  the  bomb  was  thrown 
by  some  one  who,  instead  of  acting  on  the  advice  of  any- 
body, was  simply  seeking  personal  revenge  for  having  been 
clubbed,  and  that  Capt.  JBonfield  is  the  man  who  is  really 
responsible  for  the  death  of  the  police  officers. 

It  is  also  shown  that  the  character  of  the 
Haymarket  meeting  sustains  this  view.  The  evidence 
shows  there  were  only  800  to  1,000  people  present,  and  that 
it  was  a  peaceable  and  orderly  meeting;  that  the  mayor  of 
the  city  was  present  and  saw  nothing  out  of  the  way  and 
that  he  remained  until  the  crowd  began  to  disperse,  the 
meeting  being  practically  over,  and  the  crowd  engaged  in 
dispersing  when  he  left;  that  had  the  police  remained  away 
for  twenty  minutes  more  there  would  have  been  nobody  left 


60 

there,  but  that  as  soon  as  Bonfield  learned  that  the  mayoi 
had  left  he  could  not  resist  the  temptation  to  have  some 
more  people  clubbed  and  went  up  with  a  detachment  of 
police  to  disperse  the  meeting,  and  that  on  the  appearance 
of  the  police  the  bomb  was  thrown  by  some  unknown  per- 
son and  several  innocent  -and  faithful  officers,  who  were 
simply  obeying  an  uncalled  for  order  of  their  superior,  were 
killed;  all  of  these  facts  tend  to  show  the  improbability  of 
the  theory  of  the  prosecution  that  the  bomb  was  thrown  as 
the  result  of  a  conspiracy  on  the  part  of  the  defendants  to 
commit  murder;  if  the  theory  of  the  prosecution  were  cor- 
rect there  would  have  been  many  bombs  thrown;  and  the 
fact  that  only  one  was  thrown  shows  that  it  was  an  act  of 
personal  revenge. 

It  is  further  shown  here  that  much  of  the  evidence 
given  at  the  trial  was  a  pure  fabrication;  that  some  of  the 
prominent  police  officials  in  their  zeal,  not  only  terrorized 
ignorant  men  by  throwing  them  into  prison  and  threatening 
them  with  torture  if  they  refused  to  swear  to  anything  de- 
sired, but  that  they  offered  money  and  employment  to  those 
who  would  consent  to  do  this.  Further,  that  they  deliber- 
ately planned  to  have  fictitious  conspiracies  formed  in  order 
that  they  might  get  the  glory  of  discovering  them.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  evidence  in  the  record  of  some  witnesses  who 
swore  that  they  had  been  paid  small  sums  of  money,  etc., 
several  documents  are  here  referred  to. 

First,  an  interview  with  Capt.  Ebersold  published  in 
the  Chicago  Daily  News  May  10,  1889. 


61 


Chief  of  Police  Ebersold's  Statement. 

Ebersold  was  chief  of  the  police  of  Chicago  at  the  time 
of  the  Hay  market  trouble  and  for  a  long  time  before  and 
thereafter,  so  that  he  was  in  a  position  to  know  what  was 
going  on  and  his  utterances  upon  this  point  are  therefore 
important.  Among  other  things  he  says: 

"It  was  my  policy  to  quiet  matters  down  as  soon  as 
possible  after  the  4th  of  May.  The  general  unsettled  state 
of  things  was  an  injury  to  Chicago. 

"On  the  other  hand,  Capt.  Schaack  wanted  to  keep  things 
itirring.  He  wanted  bombs  to  be  found  here,  there,  all 
around,  everywhere.  I  thought  people  would  lie  down  and 
sleep  better  if  they  were  not  afraid  that  their  homes  would 
be  blown  to  pieces  any  minute.  But  this  man,  Schaack, 
this  little  boy  who  must  have  glory  or  his  heart  would  be 
broken,  wanted  none  of  that  policy.  Now,  here  is  something 
the  public  does  not  know.  After  we  got  the  anarchist 
societies  broken  up,  Sohaack  wanted  to  send  out  men  to 
again  organize  new  societies  right  away.  You  see  what 
this  would  do.  He  wanted  to  keep  the  thing  boiling,  keep 
himself  prominent  before  the  public.  Well,  I  sat  down  on 
that,  I  didn't  believe  in  such  work,  and  of  course  Schaack 
didn't  like  it. 

"After  I  heard  all  that,  I  began  to  think  there  was 
perhaps  not  so  much  to  all  this  anarchist  business  as 
they  claimed,  and  I  believe  T  was  rirjM.  Schaack  thinks 
he  knew  all  about  those  anarchists.  Why,  I  knew  more 


52 

at  that  time  than  he  knows  to-day  about  them.  I  was  fol- 
lowing them  closely.  As  soon  as  Schaack  began  to  get  some 
notoriety,  however,  he  was  spoiled." 

This  is  a  most  important  statement,  when  a  chief  of 
police  who  has  been  watching  the  anarchists  closely  says 
that  he  was  convinced  that  there  was  not  so  much  in  all 
this  anarchist  business  as  was  claimed,  and  that  a  police 
captain  wanted  to  send  out  men  to  have  other  conspiracies 
formed  in  order  to  get  the  credit  of  discovering  them  and 
keep  the  public  excited,  it  throws  a  flood  of  light  on  the 
whole  situation  and  destroys  the  force  of  much  of  the  testi- 
mony introduced  at  the  trial. 

For  if  there  has  been  any  such  extensive  conspiracy  as 
the  prosecution  claims,  the  police  would  have  soon  discov- 
ered it.  No  chief  of  police  could  discover  a  determination 
on  the  part  of  an  individual,  or  even  a  number  of  separate 
individuals,  to  have  personal  revenge  for  having  been  mal- 
treated, nor  could  any  chief  discover  a  determination  by  any 
such  individual  to  kill  the  next  policeman  who  might  assault 
him.  Consequently,  the  fact  that  the  police  did  not  discover 
any  conspiracy  before  the  Haymarket  affair  shows  almost 
conclusively  that  no  such  extensive  combination  could  have 
existed. 

As  further  bearing  on  the  question  of  creating  evidence 
reference  is  made  to  the  following  affidavits: 


53 
STATE  OF  ILLINOIS, 


COUNTY  OF  COOK. 

Jacob  Mikolanda,  being  first  duly  sworn,  on  oath  states,  that  he 
took  no  part  in  the  so-called  May  troubles  of  1886;  that  on  or  about 
the  8th  day  of  May,  1886,  two  police  officers,  without  a  warrant  or 
without  assigning  any  reasons  therefor,  took  this  affiant  from  a  saloon, 
where  he  was  conducting  himself  peacefully,  and  obliged  him  to 
accompany  them  to  his  house;  that  the  same  officers  entered  his  house 
without  a  search  warrant,  and  ransacked  the  same,  not  even  permit- 
ting the  baby's  crib  with  its  sleeping  occupant,  to  escape  their  unlaw- 
ful and  fruitless  search;  that  in  about  a  month  after  this  occurrence 
this  affiant  was  summoned  by  Officer  Peceny  to  accompany  him  to 
the  police  station,  as  Lieutenant  Shepard  wished  to  speak  to  me;  that 
there  without  a  warrant  this  affiant  was  thrown  into  jail;  that  he  was 
thereupon  shown  some  photographs  and  asked  if  he  knew  the  per- 
sons, and  on  answering  to  the  affirmative  as  to  some  of  the  pictures, 
he  was  again  thrown  into  prison;  that  he  was  then  transferred  from 
one  station  to  another  for  several  days;  that  he  was  importuned  by 
a  police  captain  and  assistant  state's  attorney  to  turn  state's  witness, 
being  promised  therefor  money,  the  good  will  and  protection  of  the 
police,  their  political  influence  in  securing  a  position  and  his  entire 
freedom;  that  on  answering  that  he  knew  nothing  to  which  he  could 
testify,  he  was  thrown  back  into  jail;  that  his  preliminary  hearing 
was  repeatedly  continued  for  want  of  prosecution,  each  continuance 
obliging  this  affiant  to  remain  longer  in  jail;  that  eventually  thia 
affiant  was  dismissed  for  want  of  prosecution. 

JACOB  MIKOLANDA. 

Subscribed  and  sworn  to  before  me  this  14th  day  of  April,  A.  D. 
1893.  CHARLES  B.  PAVLICEK, 

Notary  Public. 

STATE  OF  ILLINOIS,  ? 
COUNTY  OF  COOK,      ] 

Yaclav  Djmek,  being  ^first  duly  sworn,  on  oath  states  that  he 
knows  of  no  cause  for  his  arrest  on  the  7th  day  of  May,  A.  D.  1886; 
that  he  took  no  part  in  aay  of  the  troubles  of  the  preceding  days; 
that  without  a  warrant  for  his  arrest,  or  without  a  search  warrant 
for  his  premises,  the  police  entered  the  house  on  the  night  of  the 


64 

7th  day  of  May,  1886;  that  on  being  requested  to  show  by  what  au- 
thority they  entered,  the  police  heaped  abuse  upon  this  affiant  and 
his  wife;  that  the  police  then  proceeded  to  ransack  the  house,  roused 
this  affiant's  little  children  out  of  bed,  pulled  the  same  to  pieces,  car- 
ried away  this  affiant's  papers  and  pillow  slips,  because  the  same  were 
red;  that  on  the  way  to  the  police  station,  though  this  affiant  offered 
no  resistance  whatever  and  went  at  the  command  of  the  officer 
peacefully,  this  affiant  was  choked,  covered  by  revolvers  and  other- 
wise inhumanly  treated  by  the  police  officers;  that  for  many  days 
this  affiant  was  jailed  and  refused  a  preliminary  hearing;  that  during 
said  time  he  was  threatened,  and  promised  immunity  by  the  police  if 
he  would  turn  state's  witness;  that  the  police  clerk  and  officer  John- 
son repeatedly  promised  this  affiant  his  freedom  and  considerable 
money  if  he  would  turn  state's  witness;  that  on  his  protestations  that 
he  knew  of  nothing  to  which  he  could  testify,  this  affiant  was  abused 
and  ill-treated;  that  while  he  was  jailed  this  affiant  was  kicked, 
clubbed,  beaten  and  scratched,  had  curses  and  abuses  heaped  upon 
him  and  was  threatened  with  hanging  by  the  police;  that  this 
affiant's  wife  was  abused  by  the  police  when  she  sought  permission 

to  see  this  affiant. 

VACLAV  DJMEK. 

Subscribed  and  sworn  to  before  me  this  14th  day  of  April,  A.  D. 
1893.  .CHARLES  B.  PAVICEK, 

Notary  Public. 

I  will  simply  say  in  conclusion  on  this  branch  of  the 
case  that  the  facts  tend  to  show  that  the  bomb  was  thrown 
as  an  act  of  personal  revenge,  and  that  the  prosecution  has 
never  discovered  who  threw  it,  and  the  evidence  utterly  fails 
to  show  that  the  man  who  did  throw  it  ever  heard  or  read 
a  word  coming  from  the  defendants;  consequently  it  fails  to 
show  that  he  acted  on  any  advice  given  by  them.  And  if 
he  did  not  act  on  or  hear  any  advice  coming  from  the  de- 
fendants, either  in  speeches  or  through  the  press,  then  there 
was  no  crfso  against  them  even  under  the  law  as  laid  down 
by  Judge  Gary. 


55 

Fielden  and  Schwab. 

At  the  trial  a  number  of  detectives  and  members  of  the 
police  force  swore  that  the   defendant,  Fielden,  at    the  Hay- 
market  meeting,  made  threats  to  kill,  urging   his    hearers  to 
do  their  duty  as  he   would   do   his,    just   as    the    policemen 
were  coming   up,    and   one    policeman    swears    that    Fielden 
drew  a  revolver  and  fired  at  the  police  while  he   was  stand- 
ing on  the  wagon  and  before   the    bomb  was    thrown,    while 
some  of  the  others  testified  that  he   first   climbed   down   ofi 
the   wagon   and  fired    while    standing  by    a   wheel.     On  the 
other  hand,  it  was  proven  by  a  numbe?  of  witnesses  and  by 
facts  and  circumstances  that  this  evidence  must  be  absolutely 
untrue.     A  number  of  newspaper  reporters  who  testified   on 
the    part    of    the    state    said    that   they  were   standing  near 
Fielden,  much  nearer  than    the   police  were,    and    heard   all 
that  was  said  and  saw  what  was  done;    that  they    had    been 
sent  there  for  that  purpose,  and  that  Fielden  did   not   make 
an}'  such  threats  as  the  police  swore  to,  and  tjiat  he  did  not 
use  a  revolver.      A    number    of    other  men  who  were  near, 
too,    and    some    of    them    on    the  wagon    on   which    Felden 
stood  at  the  time,  swear  to   the   same    thing.     Fielden   him- 
self swears  that  he  did  not   make    any  such    threats    as    the 
police  swore  to,  and  further,  that  he  never   had    or    used    a 
revolver  in  his  life.     But  if  there  were  any  doubt  about  the 
fact  that  the  evidence  charging   Fielden  with    having  used  a 
revolver  is  unworthy  of  credit,  it  is  removed  by  Judge  Gary 
and  State's  Attorney  Grinnell.     On  November  8,  1887,  when 
be  question  of  commuting  the  death  sentence  M  to  Fieldan 


56 

was  before  the  governor,  Judge  Gary  wrote  a  long  letter  in 
regard  to  the  case  in  which,  in  speaking  of  Fielden,  he 
among  other  things,  says:  "There  is  in  the  nature  and  pri- 
vate character  of  the  man  a  love  of  justice,  an  impatience 
at  undeserved  sufferings.  *  *  *  In  his  own  private  life 
he  was  the  honest,  industrious  and  peaceful  laboring  man. 
In  what  he  said  in  court  before  sentence  he  was  respectful 
and  decorous.  His  language  and  conduct  since  have  been 
irreproachable.  As  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  knew  of 
any  preparation  to  do  the  specific  act  of  throwing  the  bomb 
that  killed  Degan,  he  does  not  understand  even  now  that 
general  advice  to  large  masses  to  do  violence  makes  him 
responsible  for  the  violence  done  by  reason  of  that  advice. 
*  *  *  In  short,  he  was  more  a  misguided  enthusiast 
than  a  criminal  conscious  of  the  horrible  nature  and  effect 
of  his  teachings  and  of  his  responsibility  therefor."  , 

The  states  attorney  appended  the  foregoing  letter  begin- 
ning as  follows:  "While  endorsing  and  approving  the  fore- 
going statement  by  Judge  Gary,  I  wish  to  add  thereto  the 
suggestion  *  *  *  that  Schwab's  conduct  during  the 
trial  and  when  addressing  the  court  before  sentence,  like 
Fielden's  was  decorous,  respectful  to  the  law  and  commend- 
able. *  *  *  It  is  further  my  desire  to  say  that  I  believe 
that  Schwab  was  the  pliant,  weak  tool  of  a  stronger  will 
and  more  designing  person.  Schwab  seems  to  be  friendless." 


67 

If  what  Judge  Gary  says  about  Fielden  is  true;  if 
Fielden  has  "a  natural  love  of  justice  and  in  his  private  life 
was  the  honest,  industrious  and  peaceable  laboring  man," 
then  Fielden's  testimony  is  entitled  to  credit,  and  when  he 
says  that  he  did  not  do  the  things  the  police  charge  him 
with  doing  and  that  he  never  had  or  used  a  revolver  in  his 
life,  it  is  probably  true,  especially  as  he  is  corroborated  by 
a  number  of  credible  and  disinterested  witnesses. 

Again,  if  Fielden  did  the  things  the  police  charged  him 
with  doing,  if  he  fired  on  them  as  they  swear,  then  he  was 
not  a  mere  misguided  enthusiast  who  was  to  be  held  only 
for  the  consequences  of  his  teachings,  and  if  either  Judge 
Gary  or  State's  Attorney  Grinnell  had  placed  any  reliance 
on  the  evidence  of  the  police  on  this  point  they  would  have 
written  a  different  kind  of  a  letter  to  the  then  executive. 

In  the  fall  of  1887  a  number  of  the  most  prominent 
business  men  of  Chicago  met  to  consult  whether  or  not  to 
ask  executive  clemency  for  any  of  the  condemned  men.  Mr. 
Grinnell  was  present  and  made  a  speech  in  which  in  refer- 
ring to  this  evidence  he  said  that  he  had  serious  doubts 
whether  Fielden  had  a  revolver  on  that  occasion  or  whether 
indeed  Fielden  ever  had  one. 

Yet  in  arguing  the  case  before  the  supreme  court  the 
previous  spring  much  stress  was  placed  by  the  state  on  the 
evidence  relating  to  what  Fielden  did  at  the  Haymarket 
meeting  and  that  court  was  misled  into  attaching  great  im- 
portance to  it. 


68 

It  is  now  clear  that  there  is  no  case  made  out  against 
Fielden  for  anything  that  he  did  on  that  night,  and,  as 
heretofore  shown,  in  order  to  hold  him  and  the  other  de- 
fendants for  the  consequences  and  effects  of  having  given 
pernicious  and  criminal  advice  to  large  masses  to  commit 
violence,  whether  orally,  in  speeches  or  in  print,  it  must  be 
shown  that  the  person  committing  the  violence  had  read  or 
heard  the  advice,  for  until  he  had  heard  or  read  it  he  did 
not  receive,  and  if  he  never  received  the  advice  it  can  not 
be  said  that  he  acted  on  it. 

State's  Attorney  on  Neebe's  Innocence. 
IV. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  evidence  for  the  state  the 
Hon.  Carter  H.  Harrison,  then  mayor  of  Chicago,  and  Mr. 
F.  S.  Winston,  then  corporation  counsel  for  Chicago  were 
in  the  court  room  and  had  a  conversation  with  Mr.  Grin- 
nell,  the  state's  attorney  in  regard  to  the  evidence  against 
Neebe,  in  which  conversation,  according  to  Mr.  Harrison 
and  Mr.  Winston,  the  state's  attorney  said  that  he  did  not 
think  he  had  a  case  against  Neebe  and  that  he  wanted  to 
dismiss  as  to  him,  but  was  dissuaded  from  doing  so  by  his 
associate  attorneys,  who  feared  that  such  a  step  might  influ- 
ence the  jury  in  favor  of  the  other  defendants. 

Mr.  Harrison,  in  a  letter,  among  other  things,  says:  "I 
was  present  in  the  court  room  when  the  state  closed  its 
case.  The  attorney  for  Neebe  moved  his  discharge  on  the 
ground  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  hold  him  on.  The 


59 

state's  attorney,  Mr.  Julius  S.  Grinnell,  and  Mr.  Fred  8. 
Winston,  corporation  counsel  for  the  city,  and  myself  were 
in  earnest  conversation  when  the  motion  was  made.  Mr, 
Grinnell  stated  to  us  that  he  did  not  think  there  was 
sufficient  testimony  to  convict  Neebe.  I  thereupon  earnestly 
advised  him,  as  the  representative  of  the  state,  to  dismiss 
the  case  as  to  Neebe,  and  if  I  remember  rightly  he  was 
seriously  thinking  of  doing  so,  but  on  consultation  with  his 
assistants  and  on  their  advice  he  determined  not  to  do  so 
lest  it  would  have  an  injurious  effect  on  the  case  as  against 
the  other  prisoners.  *  *  *  I  took  the  position  that  such 
discharge  being  clearly  justified  by  the  testimony  would  not 
prejudice  the  case  as  to  the  others." 

Mr.  Winston  adds  the  following  to  Mr.  Harrison's  letter: 

MARCH,  21,  1889. 

I  concur  in  the  statement  of  Mr.  Harrison;  I  never  believed  there 
was  sufficient  evidence  to  convict  Mr.  Neebe,  and  so  stated  during 
the  trial.  F.  S.  WINSTON. 

In  January,  1890,  Mr.  Grinnell  wrote  a  letter  to  Gov- 
Fifer,  denying  that  he  had  ever  made  any  such  statement 
as  that  mentioned  by  Mr.  Harrison  and  Mr.  Winston;  also 
that  he  did  believe  Neebe  guilty;  that  Mr.  Harrison  sug 
gested  the  dismissal  of  the  case  as  to  Neebe,  and  further 
that  he  would  not  have  been  surprised  if  Mr.  Harrison  had 
made  a  similar  suggestion  as  to  others  and  then  he  says: 
"I  said  to  Mr.  Harrison  at  that  time  substantially  that  I 
was  afraid  that  the  jury  miyht  not  think  the  testimony  pre- 
sented in  the  case  sufficient  to  convict  Neebe,  but  that  it  was 
in  their  province  to  pass  upon  it 


60 

Now,  if  the  statement  of  Messrs.  Harrison  and  Winston 
is  true,  then  Grinnell  should  not  have  allowed  Neebe  to  be 
sent  to  the  penitentiary,  and  even  if  we  assume  that  both 
Mr.  Harrison  and  Mr.  Winston  are  mistaken  and  that  Mr. 
Grinnell  simply  used  the  language  he  now  says  he  used, 
then  the  case  must  have  seemed  very  weak  to  him.  If,  with 
a  jury  prejudiced  to  start  with,  a  judge  pressing  for  convic- 
tion, and  amid  the  almost  irresistible  fury  with  which  the 
trial  was  conducted,  he  still  was  afraid  the  jury  might  not 
think  the  testimony  in  the  case  was  sufficient  to  convict 
Neebe,  then  that  testimony  must  have  seemed  very  weak  to 
him,  no  matter  what  he  may  now  protest  about  it. 

When  the  motion  to  dismiss  the  case  as  to  Neebe  was 
made,  defendants'  counsel  asked  that  the  jury  might  be  per- 
mitted to  retire  while  the  motion  was  being  argued,  but  the 
court  refused  to  permit  this,  and  kept  the  jury  present 
where  it  could  hear  all  that  the  court  had  to  say,  then  when 
the  argument  on  the  motion  was  begun  by  defendants' 
counsel  the  court  did  not  wait  to  hear  from  the  attorneys 
for  the  state,  but  at  once  proceeded  to  argue  the  points 
itself  with  the  attorneys  for  the  defendants,  so  that  while 
the  attorneys  for  the  state  made  no  argument  on  the  motion, 
twenty-five  pages  of  the  record  are  filled  with  the  colloquy 
or  sparring  that  took  place  between  the  court  and  the  coun- 
sel for  the  defendants,  the  court  in  the  presence  of  the  jury 
making  insinuations  as  to  what  inference  might  be  drawn  by 
the  jury  from  the  'fact  that  Neebe  owned  a  little  stock  in  a 
paper  called  the  Arbeiter  Zeiiung  and  had  been  seen  there 


61 

although  he  took  no  part  in  the  management  until  after  the 
Haymarket  troubles,  it  appearing  that  the  Arbeiter  Zeiiung 
had  published  some  very  seditious  articles  with  which,  how- 
ever, Neebe  had  nothing  to  do.  Finally  one  of  the  counsel 
for  the  defendants  said:  "I  expected  that  the  representatives 
of  the  state  might  say  something,  but  as  your  honor  saves 
them  that  trouble,  you  will  excuse  me  if  I  reply  briefly  to 
the  suggestions  you  have  made."  Some  other  remarks  were 
made  by  the  court,  seriously  affecting  the  whole  case,  and 
prejudicial  to  the  defendants,  and  then,  referring  to  Neebe 
the  court  said: 

"Whether  he  had  anything  to  do  with  the  dissemination 
of  advice  to  commit  murder  ia  I  think  a  debatable  question 
which  the  jury  ought  to  pass  on."  Finally  the  motion  was 
overruled.  Now,  with  all  of  the  eagerness  shown  by  the 
court  to  con  rict  Neebe,  it  must  have  regarded  the  evidence 
against  him  as  very  weak,  otherwise  it  would  not  have 
made  this  admission,  for  if  it  was  a  debatable  question 
whether  the  evidence  tended  to  show  guilt,  then  that  evi- 
dence must  have  been  far  from  being  conclusive  upon  the 
question  as  to  whether  he  was  actually  guilty;  this  being  so, 
the  verdict  should  not  have  been  allowed  to  stand,  because 
the  law  requires  that  a  man  shall  be  proven  to  be  guilty 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  before  he  can  be  convicted  of  a 
criminal  offense.  I  have  examined  all  of  the  evidence 
against  Neebe  with  care  and  it  utterly  fails  to  prove  even 
the  shadow  of  a  case  against  him.  Some  of  the  other  de- 
fendants were  guilty  ef  using  seditious  language,  but  even 
this  cannot  be  said  of  Neebe. 


G2 

Prejudice  or  Subserviency  of  Judge, 
V. 

It  is  further  charged  with  much  bitterness  by  those 
who  speak  for  the  prisoners  that  the  record  of  the  case 
shows  that  the  judge  conducted  the  trial  with  malicious 
ferocity  and  forced  eight  men  to  be  tried  together;  that  in 
cross-examining  the  state's  witnesses  he  confined  counsel  for 
the  defense  to  the  specific  points  touched  on  by  the  state, 
while  in  the  cross-examination  of  the  defendants'  witnesses 
he  permitted  the  state's  attorney  to  go  into  all  manner  of 
subjects  entirely  foreign  to  the  matters  on  which  the  wit- 
nesses were  examined  in  chief;  also  that  every  ruling 
throughout  the  long  trial  'on  any  contested  point  was  in 
favor  of  the  state,  and  further,  that  page  after  page  of  the 
record  contains  insinuating  remarks  of  the  judge,  made  in 
the  hearing  of  the  jury,  and  with  the  evident  intent  of 
bringing  the  jury  to  his  way  of  thinking;  that  these 
speeches,  coming  from  the  court,  were  much  more  dam- 
aging than  any  speeches  from  the  state's  attorney  could 
possibly  have  been;  that  the  state's  attorney  often 
took  his  cue  from  the  judge's  remarks;  that  the 
judge's  magazine  article  recently  published,  although  written 
nearly  six  years  after  the  trial,  is<  yet  full  of  venom;  that, 
pretending  to  simply  review  the  case,  he  had  to  drag  into 
his  article  a  letter  written  by  an  excited  woman  to  a  news- 
paper after  the  trial  was  over,  and  which  therefore  had 
nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  case  and  was  put  into  the 


63 

articles  simply  to  create  a  prejudice  against  the  woman,  as 
well  as  against  the  dead  and  the  living,  and  that,  not  con- 
tent wtth  this,  he  in  the  same  article,  makes  an  insinuating 
attack  on  one  of  the  lawyers  for  the  defense,  not  for  any- 
thing done  at  the  trial,  but  because  more  than  a  year  after 
the  trial  when  some  of  the  defendants  had  been  hung,  he 
ventured  to  express  a  few  kind,  if  erroneous,  sentiments 
over  the  graves  of  his  dead  clients,  whom  he  at  least  be-* 
lieved  to  be  innocent.  It  is  urged  that  such  ferocity  or 
subserviency  is  without  a  parallel  in  all  history;  that  even 
Jeffries  in  England  contented  himself  with  hanging  his  vic- 
tims, and  did  not  stop  to  berate  them  after  they  were  dead 

These  charges  are  of  a  personal  character,  and  while 
they  seem  to  be  sustained  by  the  recorS  of  the  trial  and 
the  papers  before  me  and  tend  to  show  that  the  trial  was 
not  fair,  I  do  not  care  to  discuss  this  feature  of  the  case 
any  farther,  because  it  is  not  necessary.  I  am  convinced 
that  it  is  clearly  my  duty  to  act  in  this  case  for  the  reasons 
already  given,  and  I,  therefore,  grant  an  absolute  pardon  to 
Samuel  Fielden,  Oscar  Neebe  and  Michael  Schwab  this  26th 
day  of  June,  1893. 

JOHN  P.  ALTGELD, 

Governor  of  Illinoia 


UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS-URBAN* 

335.8AL79R  C001 

REASONS  FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN  CHGO 


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